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1. Summary1 
Corruption is rampant in all spheres of public and political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(hereafter also referred to as BiH). In Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), BiH scored 3.1 out of 10 and ranked 82nd on a descending scale of 145 countries 
reviewed.  
 
The full version on this report shows how corruption threatens the consolidation of a viable, strong, 
multi-ethnic state and breeds politicians and institutions unable or unwilling to implement reforms 
that are crucial for the country’s integration into the European Union and NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace. Corruption holds back much needed investment and prevents economic growth that would 
benefit the population at large.  
 
In BiH, we find that corruption exists in all its facets – bribery, nepotism, embezzlement, diversion 
of public funds, tax fraud, illegal rent seeking, kick-back schemes etc. The victims of corruption are 
often the most vulnerable groups: the elderly, the unemployed and other low-income groups, who 
cannot afford to pay for up-grades of health care services; women, who, through traditional role 
patterns, are more often exposed to corruption; and minorities, facing a judiciary and administration 
appointed according to ethnic majority criteria, are denied impartial treatment based on clearly 
established rules and regulations.  
 
Petty or administrative corruption is routine. Few decisions in the political, social and judicial 
sectors are open and transparent. The full version of this report gives a detailed account of the most 
frequent types of corruption in BiH and the institutions which are most affected. Among them are 
public utilities, customs, police and other enforcement bodies, judiciary, public sector delivery 
(herein health, education, business registration process and privatizations). These are very 
important, as it is here that the citizens meet the state and it is here that faith in the state is lost or 
won. Unfortunately, evidence point to that more is lost than won at this level. Of even greater 
concern, however, is the fact that there is widespread evidence of high-level corruption linking 
political parties/senior politicians to organized crime.  
  
Political and grand scale corruption has multiple roots. We argue that the pre-war dispensation was 
not without corruption. The communist past with weak democratic values and institutions, low 
economic development and non-transparent decision-making created a fertile ground for what was 
to come. The war in BiH left a vacuum where a corrupt political class emerged. By focusing on 
ethnic hatred, these elements were able to obscure some of the profit-making motives behind the 
war. This focus explains the prolongation of the war and the post-war criminalized dispensation. 
The far-reaching, cross-ethnic collusion between political elites and their criminal networks during 
and after the war leads us to point to greed as a powerful motivation behind much of the most 
serious political corruption we observe in BiH today.  
                                                 
1 This report exists in two versions. A short paper is produced for those who have less interest in the 
underlying causes of the corruption problem and its manifestations across sectors and institutions. The full 
range of recommendations is included in the short version. The extended version on the other hand gives a 
comprehensive picture of the corruption problem. Part one look into the specifics of corruption in the Bosnian 
context, including the background causes of the problem. It analyzes how these background factors shape 
current patterns and mechanisms of corruption in the most affected sectors. Part two map out the most 
important responses to the problem by the international community and national authorities to date. Part three 
provide recommendations to Sida on possible directions of how best to address corruption in its next Country 
Strategy for Development Co-operation 2006 – 2010.  
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The new criminal elite has close ties to the nationalist political parties. And while elites in other 
transitional countries have taken years to establish, the transition in BiH happened overnight. As 
opposed to the nomenclature elsewhere, which turned political capital into economic capital, the 
accumulation of wealth that took place during the war in BiH was very effectively turned into 
political capital. 
 
We also point to the complex governmental structures established by the Dayton Peace Agreement 
(DPA) as being unsuitable for democratic politics and effective government.  While the pre-war 
Yugoslav public sector had already been highly politicized, the war cemented this into politicization 
based on the ethnic majority principle.  The result is that Bosnia and Herzegovina is being kept 
divided along ethnic lines. The public  sector in general and the public administration in particular, 
provide most of today’s employment in BiH. It is still being manipulated and exploited by the 
leading nationalist parties. This politicized public sector is in itself corrupt and provides a 
framework for more corruption to occur.  
 
The bloated public sector accounts for 54% of the annual GDP - more than in any other European 
country. The different layers result in confusion over legislation and competencies. They make it 
difficult for citizens to hold government structures accountable, as there is no clarity on the areas or 
services for which they are responsible. This facilitates the abuse of office and the diversion of 
public funds. Government in BiH is therefore not yet rooted in the principles of democratic 
governance: transparency, accountability to the citizen, stakeholder involvement and consultation in 
policy making.  
 
As a result, many ordinary citizens are left under or close to the poverty line. Many Bosnians have 
found a living in the gray/black economy and through contributions from the Bosnian diaspora. 
Participating in corruption is for many a survival strategy. The situation is made worse by the lack 
of a sense of responsibility and ownership of Bosnians for their country’s own affairs. This dates 
back to the pre-war period, and even further. The post-war presence and the invasive policy-making 
authority of the international community have contributed to a loss of ownership of the Bosnians for 
the challenges ahead. This remains one of the biggest obstacles to moving BiH forward.  
 
Unfortunately, we find that the media and the civil society are unable to make a meaningful 
contribution to better the situation. Their role has been to throw up dust, rather than to disentangle 
the problem and show the fine line between mismanagement and corruption, and to point to a way 
forward. There is some evidence that citizens are beginning to recognize the cost of corruption. 
However, trust in the political system and its institutions is so low that few are actively demanding 
new or cleaner forms of government.   
 
The Bosnian government elaborated a Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS or Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper), which was adopted in March 2004 by the Council of Ministers. The 
‘Strategy for Combating Crime and Corruption’ is an integral part of the MTDS; it is complemented 
by an Anti-Corruption Action Plan. The Strategy is a largely descriptive document, in which the 
Bosnian authorities commit themselves to legislative, institutional and educational activities. It 
outlines broader concerns about good governance and repression of corruption through investigation 
and prosecution, and strengthening the judiciary and law enforcement agencies.  
 
The reduction of the level of corruption and the severing of links to organized crime should be a top 
priority for all Bosnian authorities in fulfilling their obligation in the MTDS. These are pre-
conditions for BiH’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The rhetoric of 
politicians of all parties would suggest that the MTDS and EU accession are high on the agenda, but 
tangible proof of commitment seems to be wanting. Few reforms would have happened without the 
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pressure exerted on the Bosnian authorities by the international community. Nor would they have 
been possible without international funding. Criminal politicians understand that the modernization 
of the Bosnian state will pose a direct threat to their operations. Political elites have therefore 
fended off reform by hiding behind nationalist rhetoric and maintaining ethnic voting patterns and 
segregated institutions.  
 
The international community, on the other hand, has repeatedly stressed its determination to tackle 
corruption. There have been some high-profile internationally funded awareness campaigns. The 
High Representative has imposed reform initiatives, and removed from office a number of 
politicians who had been openly exposed as being corrupt. Acknowledging that it is difficult to 
address corruption in isolation from the wider institutional and structural context in which it occurs, 
donors have mainly opted to embed corruption concerns into comprehensive sectoral reform efforts.  
 
Donors have set out an ambitious reform agenda in BiH, and have put in place an advanced 
legislative and institutional setup compared to many other transitional countries. However, we find 
that BiH has seen few explicit anti-corruption programs and projects. Reforms have targeted the 
overall establishment of the rule of law, including the reform, or in most cases creation, of a 
national legal framework and the restructuring of the judiciary and enforcement institutions at state, 
entity and cantonal/district levels. The donor community in BiH has therefore addressed corruption 
as part of larger governance, economic and judicial reform packages. 
  
These efforts have had limited success. Often, they have focused excessively on passing legislation 
without paying sufficient attention to subsequent implementation. Public campaigns have not been 
accompanied by parallel attempts to address the issues they raised (and have perhaps contributed to 
public cynicism). Most importantly, with few exceptions, the Bosnian authorities have failed to 
show a real commitment to challenge corruption.  
  
Defining an anti-corruption agenda for the international community in general, and for bilateral 
donors like Sida in particular, is a challenge under these circumstances. Experience from anti-
corruption interventions elsewhere suggests that progress cannot be achieved without the full 
cooperation of national authorities. The lack of political will described in this report could justify a 
recommendation not to engage until the circumstances have changed.  
 
What then is the role of the bilateral donors. 
 
However, the authors believe that it is essential to address corruption and organized crime in BiH – 
both in order to minimize the consequences for Europe and to facilitate the countries progress 
towards Europe. This report therefore suggests a number of possible interventions focused on:  
 
· helping the government fulfilling its obligations under the MTDS and the EU pre-
accession agenda, and spend less effort and resources on participating in a range of 
other less binding regional initiatives; 
· expediting the establishment of an independent judicial sector with the resources to 
tackle the major political and criminal actors; 
· enforce strict control over the financing of political parties; 
· grooming a new generation of politicians and civil servants with a genuine commitment 
to open and transparent government;  
· contributing to a rationalization of Bosnian government structures, which increases 
their transparency and accountability;  
· developing a business sector that will reject the transaction costs of corruption;  
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· reforming the ownership structure of the media, and increasing journalistic integrity and 
professionalism; 
· changing the way NGOs interact with citizens, government and the donors: 
· helping citizens transform their knowledge of the cost of corruption into mature 
political demands. 
CMI REPORT CORRUPTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – 2005 R 2005: 8 
 5 
2. Introduction  
Ten years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), and despite a high-profile 
international presence with wide-ranging powers, and high-levels of international assistance2, 
corruption in BiH pervades all aspects of life.  
 
Corruption threatens the consolidation of a viable, strong, multi-ethnic state with politicians and 
institutions able to implement reforms that are crucial for the country’s integration into the 
European Union and NATO’s Partnership for Peace and thus consolidates the country’s division 
along ethnic lines. It holds back much needed investment and prevents economic growth that would 
benefit the population at large.  
 
Corruption and poverty go hand in hand. While poverty certainly facilitates corruption, corruption 
is, more importantly, a root cause for poverty and seriously reduces the impact of any pro-poor 
reform effort. For donor agencies with poverty reduction at the core of their mission, the present 
level of poverty – 19.5% of the population below the poverty line (25% in the RS and 16% in the 
Federation) and another 30% just above that line, ready to slip with even small declines in income3 - 
is cause for serious concern.  
 
The victims of corruption are often the most vulnerable groups: the elderly and other low-income 
groups, who cannot afford to pay for up-grades of health care services; women, who, through 
traditional role patterns, are more often exposed to corruption; and minorities, facing a judiciary and 
administration appointed according to ethnic majority criteria are denied impartial treatment based 
on clearly established rules and regulations.  
 
In BiH, we find that corruption exists in all its facets – bribery, nepotism, embezzlement, diversion 
of public funds, tax fraud, illegal rent seeking, kick-back schemes etc. Rumors and anecdotal 
evidence about corruption are in no short supply. This report will highlight concrete examples of the 
range of corrupt activities and give evidence on the multitude of actors involved. On both 
dimensions we encounter a more complex situation than researchers normally find when conducting 
country specific analyses of corruption.  
 
In this study we are trying to supplement earlier studies of corruption which have used a fixed 
framework or a set of integrity “pillars” to assess a country’s institutional framework and its efforts 
against corruption. Our contribution will be to introduce a milieu and set of players which are not 
treated as central in most anti-corruption studies, namely the covert world of smugglers, war 
criminals, traffickers and the security establishment. It is these groups that in various ways very 
often block the reforms that donors are putting forward.  
 
For the purposes of this report, we define corruption as any transaction between private and public 
sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private -regarding 
payoffs. From this comes the characteristic of the corrupt state as an 'extractive state', 
'neopatriomonial state', 'kleptocracy', i.e. the state that steals. This is a useful conceptualisation, but 
for our purposes it is equally important to have a look at who the “corrupters” are – who offers the 
                                                 
2 International assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1996 to 2003 is estimated to have amounted to over 
US$ 5 billion See World Bank CAS 2004 at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/08/24/000012009_20040824095015/Rendere
d/PDF/291960BA.pdf  
3 Ibid. 
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bribe, why and how is it done, and what the advantages to be gained are. This analysis leads us to 
introduce the notion of “the criminalized state”, a concept which we will try to give credence to in 
this report. 
  
This study has three parts. Part one will look into the specifics of corruption in the Bosnian context, 
including the background causes of the problem. It will also analyze how these background factors 
shape current patterns and mechanisms of corruption in the most affected sectors. Part two will map 
the most important responses to the problem by the international community and national 
authorities to date. Extrapolating from this analysis, part three will provide recommendations to 
Sida on possible directions of how best to address corruption in its next Country Strategy for 
Development Co-operation 2006 – 2010.  
 
This is a qualitative, not a quantitative analysis. The prime data for the report is material collected 
during two field missions, through desk review, through structured questions to relevant 
stakeholders by e-mail, and from the authors’ prior work experience on anti-corruption 
programming in BiH and in the wider region. Quantitative data will be used where available; yet, 
there is a scarcity of such data, and particularly of hard data not based on perceptions. The majority 
of the data will be coming from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Surveys and 
will mainly be used to illustrate points. And while perceptions are important for policy makers, 
politicians and donors, the authors also caution against and will not draw conclusions from weak 
perception data4.  
2.1  Sida policy on AC 
Corruption has been identified as a major impediment for reaching Sida’s development goals of 
poverty reduction, economic development, and the building of constitutionally based democratic 
societies. Anti-corruption concerns had therefore been defined as one of three strategic priorities for 
the 2005-2007 period, and shall be streamlined into every aspect of the agency’s operations: 
· within its own organization 
· within projects and programs supported by Sida 
· through strategic activities against corruption in partner countries 
· through participation at the global level and in international cooperation 
 
This includes the development of country strategies with risk analysis on corruption5. These 
analyses ought to be sector based and emphasis should be put on the respective country’s 
administrative system, include considerations on how political competition is financed, and analyze 
the anti-corruption section of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to seek out the level of 
political will to fight corruption. Possible interventions should broadly follow Sida’s strategic areas 
of interest: 
· civil society and media organizations  
· general transparency measures 
· good governance, including public financial management 
· institution building, with an emphasis on the judic ial system 
 
                                                 
4 There is confusion on key concepts like gift giving – should it be included in a definition of corruption and is 
it damaging. BiH is identified as one of the countries with a strong tradition for gift-giving, and many 
Bosnians feel that giving gifts is not corruption. In such circumstances those involved and even some 
observers would point to the positive traits of this practice and its historical significance. We would strongly 
argue against such cultural relativism as it excuses corrupt practices. For further reading on perceptions 
studies see: http://www.tiri.org/documents/boundaries.pdf  
5 Sida, Sidas antikorruptionsregel, handledning Avdeling for Policy och Metod.  
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This evaluation follows this track and makes suggestions for reform efforts which are broadly 
consistent with Sida’s overall priorities.  
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3. Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
3.1 Horizontal Issues – Root Causes and Effects 
In Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), BiH scored of 3.1 out of 
10 and ranked 82nd on a descending scale of 145 countries reviewed. To put this result in a regional 
perspective: in the same CPI, Slovenia ranked 31st with a score of 6; Bulgaria was 54th with a score 
of 4.1, and Croatia 67th with a score of 3.5. Corruption is perceived to be worse in Macedonia and 
Serbia, which ranked equal at 97th with a score of 2.7 and in Albania which ranked 108th with a 
score of 2.5. With a score of 3.1, BiH is just marginally above the threshold score of 3 at or below 
which corruption is being classified as rampant6.  There is no overall trend indicating that the 
overall level of corruption is going either direction. And if BiH had improved in the rankings that 
still could simply be down to the problem gotten worse in other places. On the pattern of corruption 
and its regional distribution the perceptions study indicate that some forms are getting better in the 
RS, while at the same time dramatically worsening in the Federation, and vice versa  
 
The CPI also broke perceptions of corruption down into the 10 most corrupt sectors. These were in 
descending order: 1. political parties, 2. the customs administration, 3. the police, 4. the judiciary, 5. 
state-owned companies, 6. the BiH presidency, 7. municipal administrations, 8. private companies, 
9. the health care system, 10. the FBiH/RS governments7.  
 
International experts estimate that losses to the state budget as a result of corruption are at US$ 1 
billion (1, 5 billion KM) annually 8. Bosnian citizens perceive corruption to be the second biggest 
problem facing the country9. And while respondents make the link between poverty and corruption, 
they make it often in reverse order: corruption is by many seen as a result of poverty, not 
necessarily as the cause of it10. While we accept that poverty has an impact on the levels of petty 
corruption, the root causes to the present high levels of grand corruption should be sought 
elsewhere. In this section we seek to reconstruct the different historical dynamics which have led 
BiH to its current corruption levels, and indicate what its present day manifestations are.    
The Legacy of the Yugoslav State - The Building Blocks of a Corrupt System 
The Yugoslav state was not without administrative corruption before the war. Ordinary citizens 
would regularly solicit corrupt transactions in order to speed up the workings of a bureaucracy 
which had few incentives for efficient operations. Still, it was the command economy, restrictions in 
trade, scarcity of resources, and ultimately mismanagement, which forced many companies to rely 
on an ever expanding grey and black market. With it came the rise in corruption of all sorts which 
ultimately tainted the law-enforcement agencies. Even though the police, military, customs and 
secret service officials were among a privileged group, the economic downturn was felt by all. 
Among the involved parties, the intelligence service was most active, as it controlled the smuggling 
                                                 
6 See for the Corruption Perception Index and the methodology used 
www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cip2004.en.html   
7 Corruption Perception Study Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004; Banja Luka 2004, p. 69.  
8 PDHR Donald Hays at the 1st Anniversary of the Signing of the UN Convention against Corruption, see 
http://www.ti-bih.org/documents/16-12-2004/Oslobodenje-10.12.04.jpg Nobody has precisely estimated the 
losses at entity and lower levels. 
9 The biggest problem is unemployment. See Transparency International 2004 Corruption Perception Study. 
10 Ibid. 
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of arms, cigarettes, people, drugs and other goods which produced hard currency for operations 
abroad. It is also important to note that even during pre-war Yugoslav times the secret police were 
using thugs and criminals as sub-contractors in running various smuggling schemes and doing other 
biddings. It is fair to say that opportunity made the thief and all indications are that abuses were 
more severe by officials in senior positions. 
The Legacy of the War I: The Rise of the Criminalized State 
Many observers describe the war in BiH as fought on ethnic and identity grounds, with animosities 
perceived as being age-old and stable. In line with Peter Andreas’ work on the Clandestine Political 
Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia we argue that the focus on ethnic hatred obscures the profit 
making motives behind the war, its prolongation and the postwar criminalized dispensation11. This 
is consistent with the far reaching cross ethnic collusion between political elites and their criminal 
networks during and after the war. Our intention is not to take politics out of the equation, but rather 
to supplement the picture with considerations of greed.  
 
The war in the former Yugoslavia came at the time when the former Republics had not yet shed 
their communist past. The country had weak democratic values and institutions, low economic 
development and non-transparent decision-making. The Sarajevo government was unprepared for 
war, both militarily and financially, and had to resort to extraordinary measures to protect the 
newfound national independence. Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, had successfully armed in the 
prewar period with the help of the Yugoslav State Security (SDB). The arms were deployed using 
the SDS local chapters in 1990 and 1991, and at the outbreak of the war the Serbs were confident 
that they would win a swift and decisive victory.  
 
Under great danger of being overrun by the Bosnian Serb Army, the Sarajevo government had to 
circumvent the embargo regime in order to arm its weak army and security forces in the only way 
possible – through the use of established and newly created smuggling channels. The Sarajevo 
government was also highly dependent on criminal combatants in the early stages of the war to fend 
off a much better equipped and manned Bosnian Serb army. The smuggling operations were 
conducted by groups in the army and secret police in cooperation with criminal networks. But the 
political elites not only subcontracted  the smuggling activities of arms, fuel etc. which were needed 
for resisting the Bosnian Serb army, but also allowed these groups to engage in purely criminal 
actives such as the trafficking of women and drugs, looting and war profiteering.  
 
The defense of Sarajevo gives a telling picture of the situation. The major criminals of the city 
spearheaded its defense in the early stages of the war, while at the same time running an extensive 
black market smuggling operation. Later, these elements became less important for defense 
purposes but carried on the smuggling operations, often in cooperation with Serb networks across 
the frontlines, an indication that criminal ties transcended ethnic divisions. It is also important to 
note that as the war developed, BiH got substantial military help and financial assistance from far 
flung relief agencies (some were fronts for intelligence services in Muslim countries) and 
experienced an influx of foreign fighters. Some of the 1000 humanitarian aid groups that operated 
in the city were doubles for smuggling operations. 
 
Greed and considerations for national survival went hand in hand in the Bosnian war, a legacy that 
has shaped post-war reconstruction and nation building. Out of the war emerged a criminal elite 
which had close ties to the nationalist political parties. While elites in other transitional countries 
had taken years to establish, the transition in BiH happened overnight. And while the nomenclature 
                                                 
11 See: Peter Andreas: The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia. In: International 
Studies Quarterly, 2004 No 48. 
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elsewhere turned political capital into economic capital, the accumulation of wealth that took place 
during the war in BiH was very effectively turned into political capital12.  
 
The emergency measures brought about by the war were not seen as harmful, but rather as 
legitimate, and the actors involved are seen as heroes and a source of national pride. Party leaders 
not only tolerated but encouraged and protected those involved throughout the war, and still do. 
Here we present the CVs of two prominent figures which illustrate how the political class emerged 
from the lawlessness of the conflict years. 
 
Ante Jelavic (*1963) founded the Croatian Defence Council (HVO - the army of Croats in BiH), in 1991. From 1995 to 
2001, he was President of the BiH branch of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). In the meantime, he also held office 
as the Federation Entity Defence Minister. Jelavic was Chairman of the Presidency from 1999 until 2000. In March 2001, 
Jelavic - who had attempted to form a third separate entity on the Croat-majority territories of the Federation - was 
dismissed from his position as the Croat member of the tripartite Bosnian presidency and chairman of the HDZ by the 
High Representative. As of 2003, Jelavic is denied entry to the US13. 
 
He was involved in a huge financial scandal around Hercegovacka Banka, which was founded in 1997, when Jelavic was 
Federation Defence Minister. Initially, the Croatian Defence Council was the major shareholder in the bank. Several 
hundred million dollars are said to have been illegally channelled to the HDZ through the bank. Jelavic himself had been 
granted large property loans by Hercegovacka Banka. Since 2001, when the prosecution started its investigation, until 
early 2004, Jelavic testified three times to the Court of BiH in connection with the Hercegovacka Banka scandal. Jelavic 
was arrested on 23 January 2004 on suspicion of links to organized crime and was indicted by the State Prosecutor of 
BiH on 13 May 200414.  
 
Hasan Cengic (*19 57) was one of the founders of the SDA. During the war, he was allegedly in charge of raising money 
for the purchase of arms for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; he is also said to have been the power behind the 
Bosnian Muslim police and to having been in control of all financial donations coming from Islamic countries (mainly 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan, Brunei and Malaysia) during the war. These donations are said to have been channelled 
through the Islamic charity ‘Third World Relief Agency’.  
During the war, Cengic became Deputy Defence Minister of the Federation BiHin 1995, and was considered to be 
the BiH Army’s Logistic Chief. At the insistence of the US administration, Cengic was released from his duties as Deputy 
Defence Minister in 1996. He remains a senior member of the SDA and MP in the Federation Parliament. As of May 
2003, Cengic is denied entry to the US15.  
The BiH State Prosecution is investigating against Cengic on charges of abuse of office and illegal arms trade and 
on suspicions of embezzlement of allegedly at least US$8 million of donations for personal gain, and of misappropriation 
of humanitarian donations for the purchase of weapons16 . 
 
These two examples show how fortunes made during the war have been controlled by the 
criminalized nationalistic political parties. They also point to the fact that embargos introduced in 
war zones can criminalize the political economy of the conflict and force political leaders to forge 
strong ties with criminal groups which are difficult to shred in the post-war dispensation. BiH is a 
prime example of such turn of events, and the often deplored lack of ownership for reforms in BiH 
is a logical consequence of this situation: Politicians turned criminals will not instigate anti-
corruption reform which will eliminate their current power base and their illegitimate sources of 
income.  
 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Executive Order 13304 by the US President of 28 May 2003 at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20030529.html  
14 Information compiled on the basis of the following internet publications: 
http://www.tol.cz/look/BRR/article.tpl?Id Language=1&IdPublication=9&NrIssue=1&NrSection=1&NrArticl
e=11490; http://www.eudelyug.org/en/documents/08-03-2001-patten-jelavic-speeche.htm  
15 See Executive Order 13304 by the US President of 28 May 2003 at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20030529.html  
16 http://www.beta.co.yu/korupcija/eng/cist2.asp?ci=1159920.  
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Politicians in BiH are perceived by the public as holding office in pursuit of short-term personal 
gains and benefits. Politicians are also aware of how they are perceived by the public. As 
accountability to the electorate is not a deep-rooted concept, many do not care. This is principally 
true on the national level. On the local or municipal level – where politicians are closer to the 
people – they are keen to point out what distinguishes them from the ruling elite. Most meetings at 
the local or district level will open with the local politician apologetically introducing himself to an 
international interlocutor with the sentence: ‘I am not a politician.’ (‘Ja nisam politicar’). The point 
being that they hold themselves to be decent and non-corrupt. These low public expectations of 
politicians paradoxically reduce the pressure for change. If politicians are seen as a flawed group, 
rather than individuals, then the public is less likely to believe that changing individuals will 
address the problem.  
The Legacy of the War II – the Politicized Public Sector 
During the war, approximately 2 million people – almost half of the population of the country – 
became refugees or were internally displaced. Specialists and experienced managers often left for 
abroad, and have not returned to BiH (a brain drain that continues today with 62% of young people 
estimated wanting to emigrate17). These people’s pre-war posts in the judiciary, enforcement 
agencies, public administration and executive boards of public utility companies were re-distributed 
by the nationalist politicians to members of the ethnic majority group, who were often displaced 
persons themselves. Entire administrative structures were newly created during the war, and 
appointments to these newly created jobs were made by political allegiances. The pre-war Yugoslav 
public sector had already been highly politicized. The war now turned this into a politicization 
based on the ethnic majority principle.  
 
The public sector, including a powerful, resilient bureaucracy, was pre-war Yugoslavia’s dominant 
employer. This public sector became decentralized during the war, but remained powerful. The 
public sector in general and the public administration in particular, provide most of today’s 
employment in BiH. It is still being manipulated and exploited by the leading nationalist parties. 
This politicized public sector is in itself corrupt and provides a framework for more corruption to 
occur.  
The Legacy of the War III – Complicated Power-Structure and Fragmented 
Administration facilitate Corruption 
The Dayton Peace Agreement also sanctioned a complicated power structure, providing for an 
initially very weak state level government, and two entity level governments, each of which are 
divided into other sub-layers: in the Federation 10 powerful Cantons ruled by the respective Croat 
or Bošnjak nationalist parties and in the Republika Srpska 26 opštinas; there is additionally the 
autonomous District of Brcko with its own administration and jurisdiction.  
  
This bloated public sector accounts for 54% of the annual GDP18 - more than in any other European 
country. The different layers result in confusion over legislation and competencies. They make it 
difficult for citizens to hold government structures accountable, as there is no clarity on the areas or 
services for which they are responsible. This facilitates the abuse of office and the diversion of 
public funds.  
 
                                                 
17 Estimate according to UNDP. See http://meero.worldvision.org/issue_details.php?issueID=51. 
18 See World Bank CAS 2004 at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/08/24/000012009_20040824095015/Rendere
d/PDF/291960BA.pdf  
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The jungle of frequently conflicting legislation and unclear division of competences also contributes 
to citizens’ distrust of the state. It can create the impression of a corrupt system, even when it often 
is red tape, bureaucracy and mismanagement that are blocking the delivery of services rather than 
actual corruption. It also makes for a weak state unable to exercise its authority effectively even 
when it tries. This creates parallel structures used by citizens as the only way to make things work. 
And these parallel structures are often corrupt and criminal.  
The Legacy of the Yugoslav Bureaucracy - The Lack of Key Concepts of Democratic 
Governance 
Government in BiH is not yet rooted in the principles of democratic governance: transparency, 
accountability to the citizen, stakeholder involvement and consultation in policy making. Policies 
are drafted in absence of any knowledge or evidence about the real situation on the ground. There is 
no tradition of consulting – or even informing – the citizen in the development of policy. The 
administration thinks it knows what is best for citizens19. As a result, very much like in the pre-war 
Yugoslav period, the bureaucracy appears to exist largely detached from the society it is supposed 
to serve, and mainly for itself. 
 
The concept of accountability has in fact been manipulated to support nationalist policies. 
Politicians routinely explain their (disruptive) actions with reference to what their electorate would 
or would not accept (e.g. on ICTY). But practical issues such as the regulation on privatization or 
public utilities are rarely addressed in this manner or, indeed, exposed to the public. There has been 
a distortion of the debate. By focusing it on the battle between ethnic groups, politicians are no 
longer accountable for the legality or the efficiency of the system20.  
 
And where in-transparent policy making is being confronted by NGO’s, the administration – instead 
of seizing the opportunity to hear about citizens’ concerns - goes on the defensive. It disputes the 
rights of anybody outside the administration to criticize it, on the grounds that people do not 
understand. The government is still far from exercising a pro-active approach to communicate 
government policies to the public to win its support, mainly, because it does not feel it needs to. 
And this lack of communication and clarity on why certain policies are being adopted perpetuates 
the impression of an impenetrable, corrupt system. 
Lack of Interest Groups Pressuring for Change 
The lack of a sense of responsibility and ownership of Bosnians for their country’s own affairs dates 
back to the pre-war period, and even further. It remains one of the biggest obstacles to moving BiH 
ahead. A functioning democracy needs to be confronted by and accountable to the public, 
represented through different interest groups pressuring for change. Corrupt politicians need to be 
ousted by an alert electorate that will refuse to give their votes to the same leaders again, if they feel 
that their interests are insufficiently represented.  
 
The international community’s funding has created an extraordinary amount of NGOs. 
Implementing partners for international donors have provided thousands of jobs in the aftermath of 
                                                 
19 See recent report by the European Stability Initiative ‘Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Post-Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation’, Berlin-Sarajevo 2004. 
www.esiweb.org  
20 See, for example, the reaction of the Serb member of the Bosnian tripartite presidency, Borislav Paravac, to 
the restructuring of the Bosnian police in the beginning of 2005. Paravac in his statement predicted 
‘dissatisfaction from citizens’ with the proposals, which aim at establishing a police force sub-ordinated to the 
State-, not the entity level. See Dnevni List, p. 4, 2 January 2005.  
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the war, and thereby ensured income to many families. But international funding may also have 
contributed to slowing down the emergence of a genuine, self-sustaining civil society. Few NGOs 
that were created in direct response to international funding would be sustainable if the financing 
was withdrawn. And few NGO’s have lobbied for indigenous causes on their own accord, without 
being backed by funding.  
 
The most visible pressure groups that exist in BiH today are possibly the trade unions (advocating 
worker’s interest, but also the return to or conservation of an unsustainable economic model based 
on the better days of the pre-war era); the war veterans and widows; and the families of fallen 
soldiers. Each group is highly politicized and manipulated for nationalist policies, but each has 
some influence. Probably the most powerful pressure group is the public administration itself: a 
strong inertial force.  
 
Yet there are also small signs that give cautious reason for hope. Students in Tuzla are reported to 
be protesting against the low quality of their education and the corruption in the higher education 
sector. The ‘Alternative Council of Ministers’ (Alternativno Vijece Ministara) – a kind of shadow 
government and made up of leading Bosnian intellectuals, artists and academics is now exploring 
ways to register for the forthcoming elections and thus to directly impact on policy making in BiH 
today. 
3.2 Types of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
This chapter identifies some of the most frequent types of corruption in BiH and the institutions 
which are most affected.  
Political Parties 
The Dayton Peace Agreement with its multilayered constitutional setup cemented government along 
ethnic lines. The autonomy provided to the entities gave political parties control over all means 
necessary to run a well coordinated criminalized economy. This fact questions whether it is correct 
to call these organizations political parties. On the one hand, they meet the minimalist criteria of 
being an organized group standing for public office. On the other hand, political platforms seem to 
be weak or non-existent, representation seems to be geographically limited, the membership base is 
low, and internal democracy is weak. The parties are close to dormant in-between elections, only to 
arise in time to attract sufficient votes based on a nationalist agenda. The opposition parties are not 
perceived to be any better on these parameters, leading to the conclusion that all features of mature 
political organizations are missing. 
 
Political parties control state assets, licensing, housing policy (an issue that is of exceptional 
importance in BiH), appointments to public offices and to management and executive functions of 
state owned companies, privatization processes, tax collection, public utilities, customs, the security 
sector etc. Still today, anyone wanting to move up the social or economic ladder within his or her 
ethnic group has to have support from one or more of the political parties and the wider networks 
that support the status quo. This nepotistic system is exceptionally stable even with the high 
turnover of officials given the interventions of the High Representative.  
 
According to polls, some 60% of Bosnians perceive that any pre-election contributions to political 
parties should be regarded as corruption, indicating that the population has some way to go to fully 
understand the concept of corruption – and of political parties and their role and functioning in a 
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democracy21. Nonetheless, when the same polls show that political parties are perceived by the 
public as the most corrupt structures in the country, these perceptions are highly relevant, as the 
mistrust in political parties and government grows and results in decreased voter turnout at 
elections. The nepotistic practice of appointments further undermines democracy, as officials are 
seen to have their primary allegiance to the political parties. The parties on the other hand do not 
take responsibility for the problems at local level, have no strategies to rectify the problems, and 
feel no need to communicate with the communities. The situation is even worse in multiethnic 
areas, as nationalist parties drive a campaign of nationalist exclusiveness whereby governing parties 
give sub-standard services to these communities22. 
 
At the formal level, several laws regulate the operations of parties. The Law on Political 
Organizations, Law on Party Financing, the Law on Conflict of Interest and the Election Law make 
up the framework which regulates money in politics, including disclosure rules and spending 
limitations during elections. The overall framework is sound but implementation is weak and one of 
the institutions set up to oversee the regularity of the flow of money during elections – the Election 
Commission – is seriously understaffed. This would suggest that the funding of political parties 
needs a serious rethink in the Bosnian context.   
 
The work of the political parties in Parliament is another problematic area. Nowhere has this been 
so clearly manifested as in the debacle over the Law on Pardon. 
 
In September 2004, the Bosnian government and Parliament passed a Law on Pardon for persons convicted or standing 
trial. The power to give pardon was delegated to the Bosnian Presidency which would have full discretion to pardon 
anyone, regardless of the crime committed. It did not establish clear  provisions of checks and balances from the judicial 
branch (i.e. the courts and the Ministries of Justice); nor did it have any provisions that would have made it compulsory 
that  pardons granted by the chairman of the presidency be made public. The law was passed very quickly, without any 
objections from MP’s and without the knowing of the International Community. The High Representative even complained 
that the media failed to report the passage of the law. The first person to be cleared from all charges was MP Munip 
Jusufovic who had been sentenced to a 10 months prison term. Within a month six pardon requests had reached the 
Presidency23. High Representative Ashdown used his Bonn powers to impose legislation to invalidate the law and stated 
“Some people are getting increasingly desperate in their pursuit of escape hatches comes as no surprise. That BiH’s 
democratic institutions should be assisting them is nothing short of scandalous. Today the scandal stops”24.     
 
The Law on Pardon showed that Bosnian political parties and politicians are very well capable of 
pushing legislation through - when it interests and affects them. The Law passed a complex 
procedure in record time - while other legislation takes months, if not years, to get passed, or has to 
be imposed by the International Community. 
Public Utilities 
Public utilities provided and provide the perfect opportunity for state plunder.  
 
In March 2003, the OHR published the results of an international audit into public electricity 
companies in BiH. The audit found that Elektroprivreda Republike Srpske ‘was losing KM 166 
million annually in potential earnings because of mismanagement, conflicts of interest, theft and 
neglect – nearly half a million KM a day’.25. The High Representative sacked the director of 
Elektroprivreda, who had allowed these abuses to happen both in his previous capacity as Minister 
for Energy of the RS, and once he become an executive of Elektroprivreda in a breach of the Law 
                                                 
21 Corruption Perception Study Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004; Banja Luka 2004, p. 20. 
22 Fadil Šero: Managing Political Parties; UK South East Europe Forum, British Council year? 
23 See Ashdown vs. the Bosnian Presidency, Beta newsagency, Sarajevo 18.12.2004 
24 Internal Sida memo. 
25 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=29337  
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on Conflict of Interest. The terms of his appointment should have prohibited him from taking up 
any position in a public company so shortly after leaving his ministerial post. In the press release 
surrounding the publication of the auditors’ reports into the public electricity companies, it was also 
pointed out that: “The abuses so damningly set out in the Special Auditors’ report on 
Elektroprivreda RS can be seen to a greater or lesser extent in all BiH’s major public corporations.  
These abuses explain why the restructuring of ‘strategic companies’ in BiH has been delayed. It is 
completely unacceptable that the citizens of BiH are paying the price for this, in terms of poor 
services, high prices, lost public revenue, and millions of KM ending up in the hands of criminals.’26  
 
There are currently three electricity providers in BiH, essentially providing electricity along the ethnic divide – the 
Sarajevo-based Elektroprivreda, the Mostar-based Elektroprivreda and Elektroprivreda Republike Srpske.  
 
The international audit found that the Sarajevo-based Elektroprivreda’s ‘income would rise by at least 50 Million KM per 
year if it resolved endemic inefficiencies. The usefulness of the company’s new headquarters building in Sarajevo, which 
has already cost 15 Million KM, and will cost another 12 to 15 Million KM to complete, is questionable…A…former 
general manager, Meho Obradovic, is alleged to have funded FC Sarajevo through loans – worth around 1 Million KM in 
2000, and benefited from an irregular housing loan from Elektroprivreda Sarajevo.’27 The audit also pointed out that 
there were shortcomings in the credibility of reading of electricity meters. 
 
For all three audits, there were suggestions that tendering contracts were not following any established or transparent 
procedures. 
 
The fact that in December 2004, the High Representative issued an order for special audits to be 
conducted in six public companies in the Republika Srpska, including the RS Telekom and Postal 
Services, the RS Forestry company and the electricity supplier Elektroprivreda RS suggests that the 
situation might not have significantly changed since 2003.  
Privatization  
When the privatization process started in 1997, it was seen as one of the crucial elements for 
economic recovery and growth, both pre-conditions for the survival of BiH as a state, and, 
consequently, the success of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Privatization, it was argued, would pave 
the way to a de-politicized economic life. An active economy would ultimately also lead to 
increased interaction between the different ethnic communities, and thus further the re-
establishment of BiH as a multi-ethnic society.  
 
When approaching the privatization of key state-owned companies, there were broadly two strands 
of arguments. On the one hand, it was argued28 that state-owned enterprises should be privatized as 
quickly as possible, regardless of whether institutional structures (such as the existence of an 
efficient tax-collection system or a functioning banking sector) to underpin the process, or corporate 
governance capacities to responsibly manage assets existed. As inefficient and often defunct state-
owned companies contributed to losses to the state budget, the priority had to be to get these 
companies off the budget as quickly as possible. A second view argued for a more cautious 
approach, advocating wider institutional and economic reforms before embarking on a large-scale 
privatization process.  
 
So far, 65% of Small- and Medium-Size Enterprises (SME’s) in the Federation, and 53% in the RS 
have been privatized. By contrast, only 32% of the large-scale enterprises in the Federation, and 
                                                 
26 See http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=29337  
27 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=29337  
28 Primarily by USAID. 
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22%29 of those in the Republika Srpska have been privatized. These account for 6.8% and 19% of 
the total capital of large scale enterprises in the Federation and the RS, respectively. This leads to 
the conclusion that there is still no genuine political support from the Bosnian leadership to move 
the privatization process forward. This is most likely because privatization of these assets would 
deprive them of the control and opportunities for siphoning off funds for their own benefit. At its 
current pace, the privatization process remains one of the biggest obstacles to the economic 
recovery of the country.  
 
The regular reports of the Federation Privatization Agency (Upravni Odbor Agencije za Privatizaciju u Federaciju BiH) 
openly point to the problems in the privatization process. For example, its report of the 22 June 2004 session of the 
Executive Board says that: 
 
‘… the responsible ministries have done very little in definition of particular regulations on inflowing of private capital 
and on the way how to manage this sector. Also, it refers to determination of responsibility in development and managing 
of infrastructure. Some problems relating to preparing of privatization would have been already solved if the obstacles 
which slowed down the process, on which the Agency drew the attention, had been removed. It is obvious that we are far 
away of any privatization arrangement in this Sector. (The eventual exception may be telecom companies). The future 
engagement of the Agency may be established only if the responsible ministries and the Government FBiH activities are 
included in order to create indispensable conditions to inflow a private capital in this sector.’  
 
The sectors affected are the electro-energy, water, forestry, gas and telecommunications sector. - The same report points 
out that a number of previous tenders had to be revoked due to parties filing complaints about irregularities in the 
procedures to the Supreme Court. In the case of the privatization of the company NATRON Maglaj, the report even 
acknowledges flaws in the procedure as it states: 
 
‘It may be noted that this procedure is not transparent.’30 
 
This situation is further complicated by the fact that the very same people that currently control 
assets are also the ones that are actually in a position to participate in the bidding process for 
companies that promise to do well on the market, since they alone have sufficient economic power 
– accumulated during the war – to do so. This leads to a situation where, theoretically, they are in a 
position to sell assets that they currently control to themselves, thereby consolidating and legalizing 
their economic power and influence.  
 
The formal responsibility for privatization lies at the entity level with the Republika Srpska Agency for Privatization and 
Development and the Federation Privatization Agency. I.e., there is no single, State-wide privatization agency. In the 
Federation, there are additionally 10 privatization agencies at the cantonal level which are charged with privatizing 
enterprises located in their respective cantons, which in turn are held by the respective nationalist parties. In other words, 
privatization so far has taken place along ethnic lines.  
 
However, as the box above shows, the institutional arrangements are such that the agencies’ work largely depends on the 
regulatory work of the line ministries, leaving them often in a state of limbo, while at the same time causing substantial 
costs. According to the weekly DANI, by September 2004, the income of the Federation Privatization Agency had been 
KM 183.525,63, out of a forecast of KM 2.5 Million, or the equivalent of 7% of projected intake. At the same time, the 
agency had expenditures of KM 1.58 Million, or 8 times more than its intakes31.  
 
Where privatization has taken place, it was indeed tainted by allegations of corruption. A major 
problem is that managers provided the documentation needed for the privatization, crucially 
including estimates of the worth of the company. But these managers were also themselves entitled 
to participate in the bidding process – a clear conflict of interest. In a number of cases, this led to 
                                                 
29 See WB CAS 2004 at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/08/24/000012009_20040824095015/Rendere
d/PDF/291960BA.pdf  
30 Quoted from the FBiH Privatization agency’s English translation of the report at 
http://www.apf.com.ba/info/izvj/1/?cid=364,1,1  
31 DANI magazine, 24 September 2004, p. 7 
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companies being sold under value to former managers and shareholders, thus depriving the state 
budget of necessary revenues.  
 
When BiH opted for a voucher privatization, it was intended that this would rapidly transfer state-
owned into privately owned property. It was also thought that it would reduce citizens’ claims32 to 
the state, by transforming those claims into vouchers that could be used to buy socially-owned 
apartments33 or shares in enterprises to be privatized. The issuing of vouchers was a severely corrupt 
process in at least two ways. Firstly, authorities of all three sides adopted an arbitrary approach to 
who was entitled to these vouchers, favoring certain groups specifically loyal to the nationalist 
leadership (such as war veterans, families of fallen soldiers etc.). As a result, a disproportionately 
high percentage of vouchers was issued to the respective ethnic majority group, which could be 
seen as an attempt to artificially increase this majority group’s share in a given company in order to 
avoid another ethnic group gaining control over companies 34.   
 
Secondly, the issuing of a massive amount of vouchers – largely over-inflated in nominal value 
compared to their real market value – created a market for trading in these vouchers. Those who had 
money and who had insider knowledge, i.e. again members of the nationalist elites, ‘bought’ these 
vouchers from poor citizens for a fraction of their face values35. This, in turn, provided them with 
the opportunity to use these certificates in the privatization of enterprises at their full face value.  
 
This was, for example, the case in the sale of the Holiday Inn, where the tender offer of KM 5 Million was supplemented 
by KM 10 Million worth of vouchers that had been bought cheaply from citizens36 . 
 
There has also been widespread criticism of the ineptness of the Privatization Agencies overseeing 
the regularity of the tender procedures and compliance with the privatization contracts, which 
stipulate, for example, provisions on staff etc. As these obligations seem to have been 
systematically violated, and as more and more details of corruption in the privatization emerge, 
demands for a revision of the process have become louder. For example, the Federation trade unions 
are putting pressure on the House of Peoples of the Federation Parliament to adopt a law on the 
revision of privatization, which has been with that chamber for consideration since May 2003. For 
the trade unions, a revision is a pre-condition for instilling some trust in the institutions and the rule 
of law.37. 
 
There is wide-spread skepticism as to the usefulness of such a revision. Firstly, it is argued that 
reviewing awarded contracts would deter potential foreign investors, who would be less likely to 
participate in any future tenders if there was a danger that any such a deal could be revoked at a 
later stage. Secondly, there is doubt about how realistic the conduct of a review really could be, 
given the costliness of such an undertaking, and that such a review would be the responsibility of 
the same institutions that were in charge of overseeing the compliance with the existing rules in the 
first place. There is also concern over the capacity of the courts and the state prosecution to deal 
                                                 
32 Such claims might have been originating in frozen foreign currency accounts, wage arrears etc. 
33 In the Federation.  
34 See Timothy Donais: The Politics of Privatization in Post-Dayton BiH. In: Southeast European Politics, 
June 2002, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 3-19.  
35 Both Donais (previous footnote) and other sources say for as little as 3% of their nominal value (see Mass 
Privatization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, AIM Sarajevo, 16 December 2000: 
http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200012/01230-002-trae-sar.htm)  
36 See Timothy Donais: The Politics of Privatization in Post-Dayton Bosnia. In: Southeast European Politics, 
June 2002, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 3-19. and 
http://www.tiri.org/documents/press_releases/20_jan_05/PWR_BosniaHerz_Devine.pdf  
37 See http://www.beta.co.yu/korupcija/cist2.asp?ci=1139033: ‘Sevda protiv Vjetrenjaca’ (‘Sevda against 
Windmills’) 
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with such cases, partly because there is a lack of competence for this type of cases. And a revision 
of the privatization process would not be able to address the fact that a substantial amount of assets 
and enterprises had de-facto been privatized already before the privatization process officially 
started.  
 
There is, however, a consensus that wherever irregularities have taken place, investigations should 
be carried out. Substantial financial fines could be applied to companies that have been found to 
violate the rules. Also, special taxation and substantive penalties could be applied to those who have 
not fulfilled provisions in the privatization contract and who have won those contracts on 
speculations. Yet, the major challenge would seem to be, as elsewhere, the effective enforcement of 
such sanctions and penalties38.  
Corruption in the Customs 
According to Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perception Study of BiH, respondents 
ranked the customs administration as the second most corrupt institution in the country (after 
political parties).  
 
Appointments in the customs service - as indeed in all financial services – until now ranged among 
the most lucrative jobs, as they were essentially controlling cash transactions. Appointments are 
said to have been made along strict political allegiances, with the appointee ‘reimbursing’ his 
appointer in different ways, either through an up-front payment upon appointment, the costs of 
which would be ‘recuperated’ through extorting illegal payments at the border, or through an 
agreement with his political master on a monthly ‘share’ of the cash taken in. Corruption in the 
customs has been widespread in both entities, although maybe more ‘efficiently’ organized in the 
RS, with a stronger connection between the Border Crossing Points and the political leadership. 
                                                 
38 See http://www.beta.co.yu/korupcija/cist2.asp?ci=1139033: ‘Sevda protiv Vjetrenjaca’ (‘Sevda against 
Windmills’). 
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The linkages between senior politicians and corruption and organized crime and the techniques applied can be illustrated 
on the example of Goran Popovic, a high-ranking member of the nationalist SDS party. In 2001, then RS Prime Minister 
Ivanic appointed him as Head of the RS Customs Services. In May 2002, CAFAO and OHR disclosed a corruption 
scandal that brought down the then RS Finance Minister Milenko Vracar and subsequently lead to Popovic’s resignation 
from his office in the customs39; 27 customs officers were also suspended from office. There were widespread allegations 
that the scam had been known to other high-ranking figures in the RS government, namely Dragan Cavic, then RS vice-
president and deputy leader of the SDS and Dragan Kalinic, then RS parliament speaker and deputy leader of the SDS. It 
was also alleged that Ivanic himself had known about the scam.  
 
Elements of the scam – through which an estimate of 30 Million KM was misappropriated - involved:  
- the running of a secret customs cartel of 27 customs officers lead by the Head of the RS Customs Department for 
Fighting Smuggling  in ‘cooperation’ with importing companies;  
- customs officers under-declaring and invoicing the value of imported goods (textiles) by as much as 3 times, in return 
for money;  
- junior customs officers paying an amount up to 4,000 KM, but at least 300 KM, for each officer per consignment while 
the remainder was shared among the more senior officers; additional bribing of local police and financial inspectors 
with 100 to 300 KM each before the goods reached the market; 
- extortion of payments from the import companies by threatening companies to be removed from business; 
- cross-entity ‘co-operation’ with company owners from the  Federation;  
- forgery of customs service stamps for paying duties and taxes. 
 
It was alleged that part of the money was used to finance the SDS’s political activities, including pre-election campaigns, 
and to pay for security arrangements for indicted war criminal Radovan Karadžic, the war-time leader of the SDS40.  
When, as a consequence, Popovic eventually resigned from the post of Head of RS Customs, he was appointed Head of the 
SDS in Banja Luka, and Member of the Main Board of the SDS. In 2004, the High Representative removed him from this 
position and any ‘other public and party position he currently holds’, linking him directly to the failure of the RS 
authorities to comply with the constitutional obligations to cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague. 
The Nexus between Organized Crime and Corruption 
The problems of corruption and organized crime are regional, intrinsically connected and deeply 
entrenched. It has become evident that the corruption generated by organized crime has been the 
most important obstacle to a sound democratization process and to the establishment of a 
successfully working market economy. Smuggling of goods and the de facto privatization of public 
tasks has had an eroding effect on the Bosnian economy, as customs, duties and taxes are not 
collected to a satisfactory degree. On the one hand, it has pushed lawful investors and small 
business owners out of the market, or worse, has led them to engage with the grey/black economy. 
Ordinary citizens, on the other hand, have been content with the trade, as smuggled goods have sold 
for lower prices in the market. In a bizarre way, smuggling and the grey economy has been a safety 
valve for many unemployed, but the costs far outweigh the benefits.  
 
Criminal networks are estimated as being able to traffic as many as 200,000 women and children 
through the Balkans every year, many of them through BiH.41 Interpol estimates that about seventy 
per cent of the heroin seized in Western Europe transited through the Balkans route. A range of 
other commodities, like cigarettes, alcohol, arms, pornography, forged goods, drugs, works of art, 
hi-tech items, stolen cars and much more pass through BiH each year. In effect, all these activities 
create an enormous demand for corrupt transactions, which becomes manifest when the informal 
economy meets formal political and administrative structures. 
                                                 
39 http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=879&reportid=155 
40 http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr2/bcr2_20020614_2_eng.txt   
41 See International Organization for Migration, ‘Victims of Trafficking in the Balkans: A study of trafficking 
in women and children for sexual exploitation to, through and from the Balkan region’, (2001); and 
intervention by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the 
London Conference on organized crime in South Eastern Europe, 25 November 2002. 
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As a result, the whole Balkans have become somewhat of a gangsters’ paradise, where criminals 
will stop at nothing to advance their interests. This includes trading and cooperating with criminals 
from other ethnic groups or nationalities. In cases where the final destination is a Schengen country, 
the trade often involves nationals from these countries or Bosnians with permanent residence 
outside the country. IWPR notes in a recent report that Eastern areas of RS are the manufacturing 
center for narcotics, as seen by large imports of chemicals. Other groups in eastern RS have 
specialized in car theft; here senior police officers and government officials are involved42. 
 
In April 2003, the then Serb Member of the rotating tri-partite Bosnian presidency and senior SDS politician Mirko 
Šarovic stepped down, thereby pre-empting his being sacked by the High Representative, in connection with the Orao 
arms export scandal, in which investigations pointed to him as the main political culprit.  
 
Orao, an aircraft engineering factory near Bijeljina was found to be producing and smuggling – via middlemen in Serbia 
– military aircraft engines and spare parts to Iraq in violation of the UN arms embargo. Šarovic was found to having 
known about the scheme and to have failed to do anything about it43  
 
The porous borders are ideal for these purposes. Through appointments along ethnic and kinship 
lines nationally and through making alliances across borders, organized crime has been able to 
exploit the lack of coordination by law enforcement authorities in neighboring countries, interfere in 
judicial processes and solicit political protection for their activities. By using threats and bribes, 
border guards and customs officials have been easy to recruit in countries where the victims of 
human trafficking and contraband originate and are transported to. Grease money is used to 
expedite processing, bribes to cover up violations of customs laws and for operating the different 
channels. 
 
The structure of the criminal activity in BiH is unlike that of Albania or some West-African 
countries, where one government controlled pyramid shape network controls all criminal activity. 
Rather, in BiH a series of ethnic and geographically based criminal groups are active and solicit 
corrupt transactions at all levels and from different professional groups. It is believed that these 
more formalized groups are controlled by a handful of powerful non-public figures with strong 
political links within each ethnic group.  
 
The competing groups will not shy away from intimidation, brute force or killing to protect their 
business. The IWPR report that the Bosnian deputy police minister Jozo Leutar was killed by a car 
bomb in March 1998. It is believed the assassins were part of an organised crime ring – linked to 
senior Bosnian politicians – which Leutar was investigating44. A rise in mafia-related killings have 
left people feeling unsafe – and with the current rate of a contracted killing reported at being around 
10 000KM, anyone contemplating investigating these elements will have to consider the personal 
and professional risks involved.  
 
The different illegal undertakings create enormous amounts of revenue which is being refinanced 
and laundered in a number of ways. Some revenue finds its way into the banking system. There are 
currently 23 active banks and an estimated €500-600 million leave the country through a scam 
where the money is used to buy goods abroad that are imported back with fictitiously low invoices. 
The Central Bank has little control, and the police is still divided between the two entities – money 
is therefore very difficult to trace. Other ways of disposing illegal cash is through investments in 
national companies. Some proceeds are used to buy real estate or luxury goods, or are funneled 
through faulty privatization processes or fictitious companies. It is estimated that little ends up in 
                                                 
42 IWPR. Balkan Crises Report, Investigation: Will Europe take on Bosnia’s Mafia? 
43 http://users.tyenet.com/kozlich/iraqscan.htm  
44 IWPR. Balkan Crises Report, Investigation: Will Europe take on Bosnia’s Mafia? 
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banks in Western Europe, due to the problems of the money being traced, but regional financial 
institutions are used, and then the money follows ethnic lines. Part of the money is also used to 
maintain the corrupt network, so bribes are given to individual politicians, political parties, trade 
unions, judges, intelligence agents, thugs, war veterans and anyone who can be used to maintain the 
system. There is also a clear link between the proceeds of organized crime and war criminals like 
Radovan Karadžic. 
 
In the post-war period, criminal elements were left to consolidate their position. Their activities 
were also indirectly facilitated by the absence of a legislative framework. We have also shown how 
organized crime has flourished in corrupt administrative structures like the ones we find in BiH. 
Earlier, we introduced the concept of the criminalized state  to show the linkages between nationalist 
political parties and organized crime. In the criminalized state  politicians and criminals from 
different ethnic groups cooperate, and we see that their obstructionist tactics normally associated 
with the passing and implementation of laws are, in fact, a theater.  
 
In the last few years, these facts have become increasingly evident to members of the international 
community in BiH. Corruption is blamed for the lack of progress on many of the indicators that 
donors use to assess progress. Unfortunately, the problem of organized crime and corruption were 
not the highest priorities in the first post-war period, as donors were preoccupied with other 
demanding issues like the return of refugees. While self-containment resulted in delays in efforts to 
enhance cooperation both internally and across the borders to match that of the criminals, corruption 
is now receiving increasing international attention.  
 
Many specialized units have been established, new laws are written, penalties increased, 
international cooperation improved and reforms of working conditions have been undertaken, etc. 
Even so, all the major advances have been heavily supported and even pushed forward by the 
international community. The question remains whether any of the advances made so far will be 
sustained if the international community chooses to leave the problem to national actors. At every 
stage, the IC will have to rely on partners who are already implicated in generating enormous profits 
from illegitimate activities. 
Corruption in the Police and other Enforcement Structures 
According to the 2004 Transparency International Corruption Perception Study, the police are 
perceived by respondents to be the third most corrupt institution, and a perception study by the 
Bosnian office of UNDP for the third quarter of 2004 confirmed that citizens’ trust in the police is 
further decreasing45. According to the TI study, 10,3% of RS respondents perceived the police as the 
most corrupt institution, compared to 5,8% of respondents from the Federation. More than half of 
all respondents believed that all police officers are corrupt46. This contrasts with 14,5% of 
respondents who reported having actually been asked for a bribe by the police (with the average 
amount of the bribe being 30,50 KM).  
 
The average citizen of BiH is most likely to be in touch with the police at the traffic police level. 
This provides the greatest opportunity for any illegal transaction between the citizen and the 
policeman to take place. In particular in the case of so-called ‘mandatory sanctions’ – for example 
for overstepping the speed limit by more than 10 km/h – often, a negotiation between the driver and 
the police officer takes place: the driver offers to pay a lower amount than that foreseen for the 
infraction, and in return does not insist on an invoice, which the officer would otherwise have to 
                                                 
45 See UNDP Early Warning System July - September 2004, http://www.undp.ba/index.aspx?PID=14 
46 See Corruption Perception Study Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004, Transparency International BiH, Banja 
Luka/Sarajevo 2004; p. 74.  
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issue. Often, it is the driver that is initiating the corrupt transaction, while the police officer is all too 
willing to accept the bribe rather than to enforce the sanctions system.  
 
But there are more serious facets to the corruption of the police and other enforcement agencies in 
BiH. Involvement in organized crime is one of them. Forced prostitution and human trafficking can 
flourish only if the local police are paid to ignore the problem, or if they are intimidated into not 
investigating it. The problem, international observers agree, lies not with the inability of the local 
police to deal efficiently with the issues, but rather with the forces who exert influence over it. 
Police actions (or inactions) become arbitrary and selective, and serve political interest groups, and 
not the citizens. 
 
Special Police Units from Banja Luka carried out an operation in late 2004 in the Herzegovinian town of Trebinje, 
cracking down on a group illegally trading in stolen cars.  
 
The local, Trebinje-based, police was apparently in the know about the scheme. Police officers either received kickbacks 
from the deals or were forced to turn a blind eye.  
 
On the other hand, BL police was very well able to gather the relevant evidence against this gang and to successfully 
carry out an operation that took the Trebinje police – which was implicated in the scheme - and the criminals by surprise. 
The operation resulted in the arrest and indictment of six members of the group by the BiH Prosecutor’s Office Special 
Department for Organised Crime47 
 
A further aspect is the damage to the reputation of the police as perceived by the public as well as to 
the morale inside the police done by revelations of corruption in the upper ranks of the police.  
 
The arrest and indictment in February 2004 of Asim Fazlic, at the time deputy head of the Bosnian branch of Interpol is a 
case in point. Fazlic was arrested on suspicions of misuse of office and of official powers, as well as for accepting bribes 
and conducting illicit mediation. There were further reasonable suspicions that he had committed the crimes of divulging 
official secrets, accepting gifts and other forms of benefit48.  
Corruption in the Judiciary 
As in other sectors of society, the war caused the exodus of many established judges and staff. 
These gaps were filled during the war with political appointees of the ‘right’ ethnic group, often 
without the professional pre-requisites for the job. Although the judiciary might not have been 
‘independent’ even in Yugoslav times, the war created a highly politicized system, with strong 
alliances to the respective nationalist elites.  
 
During its work from 1998 to 2000, the Judicial System Assessment Program (JSAP) run under the 
auspices of the UN Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBiH) found that ‘judges were not 
independent, did not consider themselves independent and were not treated as such by other 
institutions. Influence was exercised over the judiciary in a surprisingly blatant manner by local 
political figures49.’ Reasons for this were to be found in the appointment and funding procedures for 
courts.  
 
‘This in itself was not unexpected, but JSAP also showed how the internal organization of the courts 
worked to perpetuate the lack of independence whenever political authorities saw that influence 
needed to be exercised, for example through the office of the court president. Court presidents in 
BiH had powers to influence judicial matters well in excess of their counterparts in other countries. 
For example, given a politically sensitive case, a BiH court president could allocate it to the “right” 
                                                 
47 Nezavisne Novine 12 November 2004, p.5. 
48 Quoted at http://www.nato.int/sfor/media/2004/ms040207.htm 
49 See Final Report of the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC), November 2004 p. 4 
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judge and might even reassign it before completion, based upon what he learned about its possible 
outcome.’50  
 
JSAP also found that the attitude of most of the judges reflected that of the institution they were 
operating in  – accountable only to itself, and working according to its own performance indicators, 
which lacked any relevance to the public interest. Judges were happy to blame outside factors for 
delays in the resolution of cases. Ways of avoiding decision-making include adjournment of cases, 
calling for more witnesses and often unnecessary expert testimonies, going on holiday or sick leave 
or committing procedural errors fully aware that this would trigger an appeal. Other such outside 
factors were cited to be the lack of a sufficient number of judges and staff, although this claim could 
be disproved by mere statistics51.  
 
While monitoring trials country-wide, OSCE observed widespread arbitrariness in the way that 
judges dealt and deal with cases. For example, war criminals that are less well connected have been 
and are tried very efficiently. But the trials of those that are better connected have been persistently 
stalled and postponed. Political influence can also be felt when witnesses withdraw, or when there is 
a sudden amnesia of witnesses during the court hearing. This is exacerbated by the absence of 
security and safety measures in the courts (for example lack of video or recording equipment), 
giving room to a range of problems such as threats of physical violence against witnesses or the 
‘disappearance’ of crucial documents for the case. Again, just as in the police and enforcement 
agencies, ineptness or incompetence do not seem to be the prime reason for the non-
functioning/arbitrariness of the judiciary. JSAP concluded that the difference between the spirit of 
the law and its interpretation and application in practice was generally worse than could have been 
assumed previous to the assessments.  
 
It is not surprising, then, that in the TI 2004 Corruption Perception Study, the judiciary was 
perceived to be the fourth most corrupt institution in BiH (after political parties, the customs 
administration and the police). These judicial weaknesses weigh disproportionately on the poor. The 
perception of a corrupt judic iary discourages recourse to legal action. The poor and weak are, thus, 
discouraged from their rights against the rich and powerful.  
Corruption in the Public Sector Service Delivery 
Corruption in the delivery of public sector services is particularly interesting from the perspective of 
poverty reduction. The health and education systems, in particular, are areas which the average 
citizen cannot ‘opt out’ of. Corrupt officials take advantage of this dependency on the monopoly 
they hold.  
 
Public sector services are also an area where the distinction between mismanagement and 
corruption often becomes confused, and where therefore, the opportunities for the system to be 
perceived as corrupt are many.  
Corruption in the Health System 
The situation in the health sector is complex. Although it remains very difficult to determine with 
any certainty the range and the extent of corruption in this field - there has not been any systematic 
data collection on corruption in the BiH health sector - it certainly exists on several levels. Corrupt 
practices can be detected at the systemic level, i.e. large-scale theft of public money, but also in the 
three major segments of the health sector, i.e. primary and secondary/hospital care, and the health 
administration. 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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Corruption at the systemic level is primarily due to the specificity of the structure of the BiH health 
care system. The absence of a uniform health care system and a common health policy at State level 
increases opportunities for abuse. And in the health sector in particular, incompetence, neglect and 
mismanagement on the one hand, and corruption on the other hand, facilitate one another.  
 
For example, informal payments by patients to doctors or medical staff are frequently explained or 
justified by pointing to their extremely low salaries. Yet, the poor quality of records and the absence 
of an internal audit function within the health insurance funds and health care institutions 
themselves make it impossible for auditors to establish in which manner and to what purposes the 
money that is being allocated52 to the 13 health insurance funds, 13 Ministries of Health and 264 
health institutions with 36.500 medical and non-medical staff is actually spent53. The system’s 
fragmentation hinders the collection of data, as does the absence of a common system of controlling 
expenses. Each fund and each health center or institution has its own records and there is no 
exchange of information between them. It is therefore impossible to establish where leakages and 
abuse occur.  
 
In 2003, 987 million KM were invested in the BiH health care system. But the majority of health funds are still claiming 
millions of KM that various public and private institutions were supposed to pay into their accounts. Tight controls of the 
budget are non-existent, and different financial reports lack precision. For instance, the Government of RS claims that it 
owes 18 million KM to the RS Health Fund, whereas the Health Fund is asking the Government to pay 58 million KM of 
debt. It is very difficult to decipher, let alone to break, the vicious circle of debts. For example, the financial report for the 
year 2003 stresses “the possibility” that the Cantons owe millions to the Solidarity Fund, but due to incomplete or false 
records kept in the Cantons no one can really determine how big this debt really is 54. 
 
In this way, the health care system is permanently kept in a state of crisis, unable to pay decent 
wages to the staff (or to maintain basic material supplies), who, in turn, takes matters into its own 
hands by demanding informal payments. Neither demander nor supplier of the bribe will report on 
it, since according to BiH Criminal Law supplying or demanding bribes is a criminal act, which can 
lead to up to five years in prison; and practitioners involved in such actions can lose their work 
permit. In this way, these payments to doctors and medical staff are not taxed, and revenues for the 
state are again lost.       
 
The lack of government oversight of the system combined with the absence of common benchmarks 
facilitates the growth of corrupt practices. With no effective government enforcement of standards 
and performance, the patient’s recourse is often a direct payment in order to ensure more responsive 
treatment and, hopefully, a better quality of service. 
 
In an attempt to get an idea of the real extent of the problem, at the end of 2004 the Center for Investigative Journalism 
carried out an in-depth investigation under the title ‘The Health Care System on Life Support’ (Zdravstvo na aparatima), 
by talking to doctors, hospital staff and patients. The research showed that a large number of patients appeared to be 
engaging in bribing medical staff, both before and after a medical intervention. The bribe ranged from 100 KM to 2500 
KM. Doctors received an estimated 120 Million KM in bribes or gifts a year. Yet, very few criminal charges had been 
filed against either doctors/medical staff, or patients. Only in recent months have four charges been brought against 
doctors in Sarajevo, Zenica and Prijedor, respectively. These cases are now being investigated by either the police or the 
State Prosecutor55 .  
 
                                                 
52 The centralized health system in the RS is acting through eight branches which spent 235 million KM in 
2003; the fully decentralized system in the Federation of BiH consisting of ten independent Canton services 
spent 712 million KM in the same period of time, whereas the Health Ministry of Brcko district spent 40 
million KM. Nezavisne Novine 10 December 2004. 
53 http://www.cin.ba/my -docs/?cid=136,2,1 
54 Ibid.  
55 Nezavisne Novine 10 December 2004. 
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Although very little concrete data is available, large bribes seem to change hands particularly when 
major or specialized surgery and expensive diagnostics are in question, or when interventions are 
perceived by patients as “life saving”. An additional risk lies in the abuse of the “principal-agent 
relationship” 56: patients often do not actually know what kind of treatment they need, and are ready 
to trust and accept any advice or decision from their practitioner. And as readiness to opt for surgery 
is high, and patients’ acceptance of it, too, there is ample scope to ‘recommend’ surgery, even 
where it is not absolutely necessary.  
 
Although corruption in the primary and secondary health care sector tends to be identified with 
bribery or “cash in an envelope” for expedited treatment, there are other corrupt practices that are 
worth mentioning. A practice dating back to Yugoslav times is that specialists employed full time at 
public hospitals are also entitled to work privately. Lack of controls means that a “private” patient 
in the afternoon can become a “public” (i.e. insurance-covered) patient the next morning for a 
specific type of intervention at the hospital. Or the doctor gets paid privately while using his official 
working hours and public facilities, as well as making arrangements for cash for his private patients 
to avoid waiting lists in public hospitals.   
 
There are also substantial opportunities for illegal practices in contacts with the pharmaceutical 
industry, given that there are no regulations in terms of choice of pharmaceutical material suppliers.  
 
A former director of the RS Clinical Center signed a contract on the supply of medicine with his own brother, owner of the 
medical equipment company “Farmaproma” from Banja Luka57. 
 
And further, due to weak and conflicting regulations on public procurement, the purchase of 
medical equipment and supplies for ambulances and hospitals also offered scope for abuse. 
 
Zoran Lipovac, RS state prosecutor, has brought charges against the former head of the Clinical Center in Banja Luka, 
Risto Kozomara, who purchased medical equipment without the requested tender procedure. The equipment was allegedly 
purchased for 62.000 KM more than its market price58.  
 
Although there are no reliable records of corrupt transactions or of ‘prices’ for certain services it is 
likely that at least some of these rumors are well-founded. There is a clear impact on the poor, 
because a small minority of people can afford to pay bribes to have access to services, while the 
poor are unable to do so.  
Corruption in the Education System 
The education sector is interesting in that in Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption 
Perception Study, it ranks among one of the less corrupt sectors. But corruption is also much 
discussed, in particular as it concerns the higher education sector; and the attainment of diploma or 
other certificates. 
 
Structural weaknesses may contribute to the blurring of the distinction between bad management 
and corruption. For example, faculties in BiH enjoy wide-ranging autonomies, including for the 
allocation of their budgets. At the same time, as there is hardly any competition between higher 
education institutions (due to their very limited number, and the impossibilities of students 
transferring from one institution to another), faculties are marked by the absence of accountability 
to their students. An extraordinary student of German at the faculty for Philosophy at Sarajevo 
                                                 
56 Also referred to as ’physician-patient-asymmetry’ in the terminology used by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). 
57 Nezavisne Novine 10 December 2004 
58 Nezavisne Novine 10 December 2004 
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University will, for example, pay 1.500 KM in ‘tuition’ fees per year, plus approximately 300 KM 
in various other fees (for use of the library etc.). Yet, it is not clear how this money is eventually 
used and there is no clear explanation of what service will be provided in return.  
 
In June 2004, Transparency International BiH conducted a survey on perceptions of corruption with the students of Banja 
Luka University, based on a representative sample of 299 students from all faculties at the University.  
 
The results of the survey show that 63% of the students believe that corruption is widespread at the University. According 
to the students, the most common forms of corruption are bribery in the enrolment process, nepotism during examinations, 
as well as the forcing of students to purchase obligatory literature and textbooks, often authored by the respective faculty 
staff itself. 11.4% of the polled students had been directly involved in cases of corruption, while more than half (56.5%) 
had heard about corruption cases from their colleagues 
 
Probably the most alarming finding was that 42.1% of the students declared that they would not take any action if a bribe 
was demanded from them, 16.4% would report the case to Transparency International, 12.4% would report the case to 
the competent Government Ministry, 11.7% would go to the media, 6% would report it to the Students Association, 5.7% 
to the Deans Office, only 3.7% would call the Police. (Perhaps reassuringly, only 2% said that they would actually pay 
the bribe.)  
 
Another cause for concern is the fact that more than half of the polled students (53.2%) would take no action if they 
learned about a concrete case of corruption at the University. None of the faculties received positive marks regarding 
corruption, and the survey shows that the Faculties of Medicine, Engineering and Law are perceived to be the most 
corrupt.  
 
The Rector of the Banja Luka University said that he had no information on alleged cases of corruption and bribery. He 
insisted that the higher education reforms should provide the instruments for prevention of such phenomena59 .  
                                                 
59 OneWorld, 14 December 2004 and Transparency International at 
http://admin.corisweb.org/index.php?fuseaction=news.view&id=116042&src=pub 
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In October and November 2004, the Citizens’ Forum (Gradansko Vijece), a Tuzla-based NGO, conducted a larger survey 
to determine students’, professors’ and university staff’s views on the alleged presence of corruption at Tuzla University. 
The results of the survey, the idea and initiative for which had come from the students themselves, were presented in Tuzla 
on 26 January 2005.  
 
The questionnaire was answered by 946 students and 67 teachers and other staff from all faculties at the University.  
The results show that more than half of all students (52.2%) are convinced that corruption at Tuzla University exists. One 
third of all students (29.5%) are not certain, but have heard of its existence; over four fifths (81.7%) of all students do not 
exclude the existence of corruptive practices in their faculties. Only one fourth of the university staff claims with certainty 
that corruption exists (23.9%). On the other hand, only 16.4% of staff believe that corruption does not exist at their 
faculty.  
 
The students consider that the most common form of corruption is bribery during examinations (i.e. giving money in order 
to pass an exam), whereas teachers also speak about nepotism and cronyism.  
Only 8.5% of the students and 19.4% of the teachers consider the marking of students’ examinations as being completely 
unbiased and fair. 50.8% of the students and 68.7% of the teachers think that the evaluation is partially fair, whereas 
22.4% of the students and 7.5% of the teachers believe that it is mainly unfair. 5% of the students claim that it is 
completely unfair.  
 
However, the most alarming finding is that more than every tenth student (i.e. 11.1% of all students) has at least once 
been in the situation of passing an examination after having given money or extended some favour to the faculty staff.60  
The survey shows that the most corrupt are the Faculty of Physical Education and Sport (where 25% of students say that 
they have been directly involved in corruption), the Faculty of Technology (15.4% of students), the Faculty of Economics 
(13.1%), and the Faculty of Philosophy (12.5%).61  
 
Almost 25% of all male university staff strongly believe that there is no corruption in their faculties. This belief is, 
however, shared by only 4% of the female staff. More female students report that they have personally been exposed to 
unfair marking of their papers or examinations (55.9%) than their male colleagues  (47.3%). Male students have more 
often been in the situation of giving money in order to pass an exam than their female counterparts (12.6% vs. 9.9%)62. 
 
The university authorities have always denied the existence of corruption in their institution.    
Corruption in the Business Registration Process 
It currently takes an average of 59 days to register a business in BiH, and 12 steps have to be 
followed. These steps are, according to the World Bank Study on ‘Doing Business in Bosnia 2004’: 
1. Notarization of the founding act;  2.Obtainment of a statement from a commercial bank; 3. 
Obtainment of a statement from the tax authorities; 4. Application for court registration with the 
respective court; 5. Purchase of a company stamp; 6. Application for pension and invalidity 
insurance; 7. Application to the competent municipality; 8. Application for utilization permit; 9. 
Application for a company ID number; 10. Opening of a company account; 11. Adoption and 
publishing of a rule book on matters of salary; 12. Enrolment of employees in health and pension 
insurances.  
 
Each of these steps represents an opportunity for corruption, as at each interface between the 
businessman-to-be and the administration, there is the possibility of a bribe being extracted to 
accelerate the procedure, or to perform it at all. As a result, potential entrepreneurs are discouraged 
from opening legal businesses and instead chose the grey economy, thus avoiding paying taxes that 
would be fed into the state budget.   
 
 
 
                                                 
60 http://www.forumtz.com/bos/dokumentizadown/Analiza.doc 
61 Oslobodenje, 29 January 2005 
62 http://www.forumtz.com/bos/dokumentizadown/Analiza.doc 
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Corruption in Public Procurement 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is spending between 600 and 800 million KM annually on public 
procurement contracts on all levels of government63. The 2002 World Bank Country Procurement 
Assessment Review (CPAR) found that before the adoption of new procurement legislation in 2004, 
there was wide scope for abusive practices through, for example, vague stipulations of the terms of 
tender and through excessive discretionary powers for officials in the tender evaluation stage. 
Tenders were also issued at such short notice that potential bidders had no time to compile the 
requested documentation. The lack of stringent regulations resulted in the official threshold of 
50,000 KM for competitive tenders being broken down into smaller amounts to avoid going to an 
open tender, and orders linked to the public official or ready to pay kick-backs. As a result, the 
World Bank study found, the private sector had a very ‘low level of confidence in the conduct of 
public tenders, complaining about excessive demands for bribes made by public officials, about […] 
bids being rejected on frivolous grounds and about a pervasive lack of transparency in the bid 
evaluation process. Many believe[d] that the winners of public tenders [were] determined in 
advance and simply choose not to submit a bid.’64  
 
The Bosmal case  
Bosmal, a Malaysian – Bosnian company that is currently building what is said to be ‘the tallest building in the Balkans’ 
in the Sarajevo district of Hrasno (and which is over three years late with the completion of that building), was 
commissioned by the BiH government to carry out a feasibility study for the construction of a highway through the 
country. The value of the construction contract is estimated to be between 2 and 3 billion US Dollars. At the same time, it 
was clear that Bosmal itself would also be interested in bidding for this contract. Despite criticism from the international 
community in Bosnia, in particular from the World Bank65, this arrangement – which constitutes a clear conflict of 
interest, was upheld. A decision on the award of the contract has not yet been made.  
Corruption in the Presidency 
In 2004, the State Audit Office looked into the financial transactions of 33 state institutions for the 
previous year. One of the reports looked into the finances of the Bosnian tripartite-presidency and 
found, inter alia, that luxury cars, hospitality expenses and business suits accounted for 6 million 
KM in 2003 (€3 million). The then member of the presidency Dragan Covic, for example, 
purchased a car worth 100,000 KM (€50,000) 66. The politicians in question blamed the situation on 
the absence of stringent regulations on public procurement at the time. It also demonstrated a 
remarkable ‘help-yourself’ attitude by the highest-ranking politicians in BiH and their apparent 
absence of any moral dilemmas when spending public money67.  
Corruption and the Media 
Reporting about corruption is common throughout the Bosnian media, and particularly so in the 
print media, probably due to the way in which corruption lends itself to be covered in this type of 
                                                 
63 http://www.delbih.cec.eu.int/en/worddocuments/word245.htm  
64 http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/08/02/000094946_02071904030296/Rendere
d/PDF/multi0page.pdf, p. iii.  
65 See interview with outgoing Resident representative of the WB J. Ingram, 6 August 2003 at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/BOSNIAHERZEXTN/0,,contentM
DK:20199409~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:362026,00.html   
66 See ‘Bosnia’s High-Spending Leaders Blow Hole in Budget’ by Renata Radic at 
http://www.tharwaproject.com/English/Aff-Sec/IWPR/BCR%20511/Radic.htm  
67 On 10 March 2005, the BiH Court confirmed the indictment of Covic on charges of abuse of power, 
corruption and organized crime. The charges date back to Covic’s time as the Federation Finance minister 
(2000 – 2003), during which he allegedly accepted bribes from businessmen that had also been indicted for 
organized crime and corruption. See RFE/RL News, 11 March 2005.  
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media. The weeklies Dani and Slobodna Bosna regularly carry scandals on corruption and 
organized crime as a substantial part of their content. Of the dailies, Dnevni Avaz – a paper that is 
closely associated with the political party SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije – the Democratic 
Action Party) and has the highest circulation countrywide 68, gives the greatest coverage of 
corruption issues. Yet arguably, it does so in a more selective way - in order to attack political 
opponents, particularly the SDP (Socijaldemokratska Partija – Social-Democratic Party), and the 
SDP’s leader Zlatko Lagumdžija in particular. Dnevni Avaz also regularly carries articles accusing 
members of the business community that do not cooperate with the paper of corruption69. 
 
The Bosnian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights notes in its 2004 ‘Report on the Status of 
Human Rights’: ‘… in the case of weekly and biweekly papers the most obvious [violation of the 
Code of Ethics] is the usage of anonymous sources, mixing of comments, assumptions and facts as 
well as the violation of editorial responsibility and violation of generally accepted social standards 
of decency. […] We must state that a great deal of […] complaints resulted from insufficiently 
professional approach of some journalists and editors, and as far as the printed mass media are 
concerned, also from the lack of functioning of self-regulation, that is from the failure to abide by 
the Code of Ethics. […] In relation to the coverage of court processes, the mass media sometimes 
also do not respect even the basic principles and regulations established by the European 
Convention on Protection of Human Rights […]. Among the principles that are […] violated is […] 
the right to a fair trial (assumption of innocence […]). It is inadmissible to give space to some 
politicians to publicly comment on court processes that are underway.’ 70  
 
However, polls suggest that 40% of the population does not actually read papers71, but instead relies 
on radio and television, in particular in rural areas. This is, at least partly, because for much of the 
population buying papers and magazines on a regular basis is simply too expensive72.  
 
The Federal Television TV FBiH (Televizija Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine) runs 60 Minuta (‘60 
Minutes’), a weekly program dealing primarily with corruption and organized crime. The Bosnian 
chapter of Transparency International awarded the program’s lead journalist, Bakir Hadžiomerovic, 
the 2004 Award for Journalistic Integrity73. 
 
However, the tone in which ‘60 Minutes’ and other media report corruption is part of the problem in 
BiH. Corruption allegations are half-proven or not proven at all (leading to a high number of libel 
cases against journalists). Mutual accusations of political partiality abound74. The overall tone of 
reporting is sensationalist, highly emotional and often hugely exaggerated.  
 
An independent, professional media could play an important role in encouraging public pressure for 
action.  
                                                 
68 http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/163/t16315.htm 
69 Dnevni Avaz also holds a monopoly on the printing of media by owning the only printing house – ‘Oko’ - 
in the Federation. 
70 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/media-d/med-recon/agreements/default.asp?content_id=385. 
71 According to a poll carried out by Mediaplan Sarajevo. 
72 Slobodna Bosna and Dani both cost 3 KM, while Dnevni Avaz costs 0,70KM and Nezavisne Novine (the 
Banja Luka based and USAID funded Independent Newspaper) – 1 KM.  
73 http://www.ti-bih.org/documents/16-12-2004/Nezavisne%20novine%2010.12.04.jpg  
74 The most frequent allegation against 60 Minuta is, for example, to be the SDP’s mouthpiece.  
CMI REPORT CORRUPTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – 2005 R 2005: 8 
 30 
3.3 Corruption and the Presence of the International Community75  
International Presence vs. Local Ownership  
The post-war presence and the invasive policy-making authority of the international community 
have contributed to a loss of ownership of the Bosnians for the challenges ahead. Politicians, but 
also intellectuals, NGOs and ordinary citizens do not feel responsible for their country. Answers 
and ready-made solutions are being sought from outside, and failures are blamed on outside action, 
too.  
 
Given the quality of the politicians currently in power, it is hardly surprising that the High 
Representative made increasing use of the Bonn-authorities since they were vested in his office in 
1997. These powers allow him to dismiss any politicians or officials if they are seen to obstruct the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The High Representative’s powers are often the 
only way to remove corrupt and obstructionist politicians. However, these powers have also created 
a serious dilemma when it comes to the development of any sense of ownership, a concept that the 
High Representative’s office and the wider international community in BiH have been keen to 
promote. If the High Representative ultimately has the authority to dismiss elected politicians, these 
politicians – and more importantly, their electorates, will be less likely to develop ownership. But 
without ownership, there will be no development of a long-term perspective of politicians capable 
of leading the country closer towards that vision and of an electorate sufficiently informed and 
motivated to support them. Crucially, the lack of ownership also raises concerns as to the 
sustainability of reforms.  
Corruption and International Aid in the Post-war Reconstruction Process 
Rumors about corruption of international aid abound. Bosnian interlocutors will often be drawn to 
statements like ‘…billions have been misappropriated.’ This sentiment is likely to echo a deep 
seated frustration by many Bosnians as to the pace and quality of the reform process. With 
approximately US$ 5 billion in international assistance allocated to Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
the end of the conflict in 1995, and with the bleak situation the country is in nine years after the 
signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, many believe that this money has not gone where it was 
destined to go. But while corruption has occurred (see below), statements like this also testify the  
vague understanding that Bosnians have about the nature of the aid and assistance and the 
mechanisms of its delivery.  
 
Estimates of the direct losses of international funding through corruption vary. The problem was 
widely discussed following a July 1999 New York Times article which estimated the figure to be as 
high as US $1 billion.76 The newspaper later conceded that this figure was probably exaggerated.77 
But all individuals working on the ground recognized that there were regular problems with the 
diversion of international funding.  
 
Reconstruction aid was in its initial phase vulnerable to being misdirected in several ways. 
Nationalist, and in many cases criminal, politicians who had become the key interlocutors for the 
                                                 
75 See case study on BiH by V. Devine in ‘Corruption in Post-war reconstruction – Confronting the vicious 
Cycle’, Tiri and the Lebanese Transparency Organization with support from UNDP, January 2005 at 
www.tiri.org  
76 Chris Hedges, ‘Leaders in Bosnia Are Said to Steal Up to US $1 Billion’, The New York Times, 17 August 
1999. See www.cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/nythedges .  
77 See Danilo Vukovic, ‘Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, April 2001, on www.seldi.net/BiH.htm.  
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international community and the ir principal entry points into local communities often controlled the 
local market, i.e. the potential suppliers of goods and services. So, for example: 
 
· International agencies could be forced into contracting cronies of the local elite at inflated 
prices, as other potential bidders were threatened or blackmailed not to participate in the 
tendering process for reconstruction contracts. International agencies could be powerless to 
stop this.  
· Sometimes a range of companies would be ‘allowed’ to bid, but it was widely suspected 
that the successful bidder would have to give a certain percentage of the overall contract 
value to local leaders.  Again, international agencies could do little if they were determined 
to undertake the project. 
· In other cases, corruption was subtler. NGOs that had received funding to rebuild 
houses in a municipality for returning minorities needed support and even legal 
permission from local leaders. These leaders might insist that in return for their support, the 
NGO would undertake a ‘balancing’ project, which they would select. Thus, as well as 
repairing returnee houses, NGOs could be coerced into, for example, improving local roads 
or even assisting local businesses. This had two negative effects: it diverted international 
funding from the real priorities, and strengthened the power of these corrupt local leaders 
because the majority population believed that they could deliver.  
 
Direct assistance was perhaps even more vulnerable. Between 1996 and 1999, the World Bank, 
IMF, EU, US and a few others committed US$ 407.4 million in budget support to the Federation 
and the Republika Srpska. However, for disbursement of these funds, the international community 
depended heavily on local politicians and administrative structures making it difficult to assess what 
happened to this money.78 Even when the entities or the state provided details of how the money 
was spent (on teachers’ salaries for example), the international community found it difficult to 
independently verify the information79.  
 
There was also a more fundamental problem with direct budgetary support in BiH. The assistance 
provided by the international community substituted revenue lost to state and entity budgets through 
corrupt activities such as customs fraud and tax evasion. In some ways, the provision of direct 
budgetary support hid the problem created by corruption.  
Corruption within the International Community 
The international community in BiH had a particular responsibility to demonstrate the importance 
of accountability and the Rule of Law. In the first years after the war in particular: 
· There were very few open recruitment procedures for international organizations and 
NGOs. Members of staff were mostly chosen on the basis of recommendations from friends 
and family already employed by these organizations.  
· International staff (as opposed to seconded staff), too, were often selected not on the basis 
of their qualifications, but through connections they had to existing staff members.  
· Internationals, in their diplomatically accredited vehicles, were regularly seen to speed or 
ignore other traffic regulations, and generally behaved as if they were above the law.   
· There were few mechanisms in place to control the payment of items such as per diems 
inside international organizations.  
                                                 
78 See Harold J. Johnson, testimony Statement at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/spaicom/word/gaotestimony-19-
07-99.doc  
79 One recent example of such an independent verification is the Audit of the Federation Ministry for Social 
Policy, Displaced Persons and Refugees, which disclosed serious irregularities in the management and use of 
funds of that Ministry. See www.ohr.int/other-doc/spec-audit-rep/pdf/FMSP-special-audit -report.pdf. 
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These examples may seem petty, but the messages they send to a local community are very 
important. The international community can only expect its guidance to be followed by the local 
community if it leads by example with the highest standards of behavior.  
 
There were also more sinister examples. In April 2002 the UN admitted in a letter that ‘eighteen 
officers of the International Police Task Force…faced repatriation for incidents of sexual 
misconduct’. No details were offered in this case, but it was common knowledge amongst the 
international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina that some of its members were clients of 
prostitutes suspected of being victims of human trafficking.80 Such behavior by international 
organizations and individuals contributed to the deepening of public cynicism and contributed to 
undermining efforts to establish the rule of law.  
Accusations of Arbitrariness and Double Standards 
In recent years, several Bosnian and international organizations have questioned the powers given 
to the international community by the Dayton Agreement. They have accused the OHR in particular 
of arbitrary and unaccountable decision-making. The merits of the OHR’s powers and specific 
decisions are not a matter for discussion here. And the debate has often been sensationalized and 
distorted by the Bosnian media. It is important, however, that international organizations adopt and 
implement highest standards of internal governance – both to protect themselves from accusations 
and to set an example to the local communities.  
                                                 
80 See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003: Europe and Central Asia: Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
www.hrw.org/wr2k3/europe5  
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4. Responses 
4.1 General context  
Responses to corruption in BiH have to be seen in the wider context of the international 
community’s and indigenous agenda for the future of the country. The immediate post-war period 
was characterized by efforts to stabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina and to reconstruct housing and 
infrastructure.  
 
The current challenges are integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures, i.e., NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), and accession to the European Union. Progress is modest at best. 
Although the 2004 Istanbul NATO summit represented an opportunity to join the PfP, BiH failed to 
be admitted because of its poor record of co-operation with the Hague-based war crimes tribunal 
(ICTY) – a responsibility that lies specifically with the Republika Srpska’s failure to apprehend 
even one single war criminal indicted in the period preceding the summit 81.  
 
Insufficient co-operation with ICTY is also the single biggest stumbling block for opening 
negotiations for a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina had since 2000 been part of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), 
which ended with the fulfillment of 18 priorities laid down in a Roadmap; this process was 
concluded with the publishing in November 2003 of a Feasibility Study assessing the readiness of 
BiH to take its next steps towards European Integration82. In the study, the Bosnian authorities are 
recommended to take action to comply with existing conditionality (co-operation with the ICTY 
and fulfillment of the accession requirements of the Council of Europe83), to deliver more effective 
government at State level, to build the rule of law, to proceed with economic reform and to 
strengthen institutional capacity.  
 
If the Bosnian authorities convince the EU of their commitment to co-operate with the ICTY, SAA 
negotiations will follow. In practical terms, this means that BiH will benefit from pre-accession 
funding, which will be substantially higher than previous and current assistance programs (which in 
2001 were € 131.78 million, in 2002 € 74.2 million, in 2003 € 80 million and in 2004 € 102 
million84). One of the short-and medium term challenges of the international community must 
therefore be to build up the Bosnian authorities’ capacity to absorb this assistance and to administer 
it responsibly, pursuing seriously the reform-path set out by European Union accession criteria. This 
challenge is all the bigger in view of the successive withdrawal of the international community from 
the country over the coming years, and the likely phasing out of the Office of the High 
Representative before a firm deadline has been set for EU accession. 
 
                                                 
81 This situation has only remotely changed after the High Representative sacked a number of RS politicians 
and officials at the end of 2004 for their failure to cooperate with ICTY. In January 2005, Savo Todovic was 
the first indictee to turn himself in to the ICTY.  
82 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/ip03_1563.htm 
83 See Council of Europe report SG/Inf(2005)2 final 4 February 2005 - Bosnia and Herzegovina: Compliance 
with obligations and commitments and implementation of the post-accession co-operation programme at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/sg/Secretary-General/Information/Documents/Numerical/2005/SG-
Inf(2005)2%20final%20Bosnia.asp#TopOfPage  
84 See facts and figures at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/bosnie_herze/index.htm#5 
CMI REPORT CORRUPTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – 2005 R 2005: 8 
 34 
The EC has commissioned functional reviews of eight vertical sectors and one horizontal sector85 on 
the basis of whose recommendations it will identify targeted reforms of the Bosnian public 
administration. Sida, together with DfID, has agreed to assist in the implementation of the 
recommendations of the reviews of the justice and economic sectors. Complementing EC funding, 
both donors have pledged support to public administration reform through funding of the Office of 
the Public Administration Reform Coordinator (PARC). Sida and DfID are trying to move towards 
implementing the concept of greater ownership. While they will exercise control over PARC (in 
particular through insistence on the establishment of clear rules for the office and the application of 
the new public procurement law for office-related purchases), the responsibility for use of the funds 
will be with the Coordinator.  
 
There seems to be no firm commitment by the current Bosnian leadership to undertake the actions 
necessary for European Union membership. The rhetoric of politicians of all parties would suggest 
that EU accession is high on the agenda, tangible proof of commitment seems to be wanting. Few 
reforms would have happened without the pressure exerted on the Bosnian authorities by the 
international community. Nor would they have been possible without internationa l funding.  
 
Acknowledging that it is difficult to address corruption in isolation from the wider institutional and 
structural context in which it occurs, donors have mainly opted to embed corruption concerns into 
comprehensive sectoral reform efforts. So, compared to other transition countries, there have been 
few explicit anti-corruption programs and projects. However, reforms have targeted the overall 
establishment of the rule of law, including the reform or in most cases creation of a national legal 
framework and the restructuring of the judiciary and enforcement institutions at state, entity and 
cantonal/district levels. Additionally, economic reforms have implicitly addressed corruption.   
4.2 Implicit responses 
Efforts in Support of the Establishment of the Rule of Law 
General 
Immediately following the signing of the DPA at the end of 1995, international efforts were rather 
fragmented; however, co-ordination between the different multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors has 
since generally led to a more concerted effort in pushing for reforms to establish the rule of law. 
This objective is pursued in a multi-pronged approach through legislative reform or creation of 
legislation where there was none before, and institutional reform or establishment of institutions 
that would ensure the implementation of the new legislation in place.  
 
The Office of the High Representative has lead this effort and has, until recently, provided a 
coordinating mechanism for the activities of EUPM, OSCE, CAFAO-EU, USAID, the US 
Department of Justice, HJPC, EC, UNDP, UNHCR, Unicef, Council of Europe and some bi-lateral 
donors and implementing agencies. Donor agencies such as Sida contribute to the effort by 
financing a number of programs or projects within the overall effort. Every three to four months, the 
European Commission’s Delegation to BiH is co-chairing, together with EUPM, a co-ordination 
meeting with bi-lateral embassies on projects targeted at the police and organized crime.  
 
                                                 
85 The 8 vertical sectors are agriculture, justice, police and border service, health, economy, education, return 
and environment. The horizontal review is looking at legislative processes and the IT sector.  
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The drive to reform has come mainly from the international community. This was undoubtedly 
necessary because of the lack of convincing commitment by local authorities to move these reforms 
forward. But the approach (push by the IC, imposition of legislation, international staffing in high-
level state institutions etc.) has not been without criticism. For example, the Council of Europe had 
strong reservations vis-à-vis the re-appointment procedure of judges86. The Bosnian Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights has repeatedly voiced concerns over the paradox created by outside 
actors instituting the ‘independence’ of the judiciary, thereby infringing on the very independence 
they aim to create.  
Police and other enforcement structures 
The police in BiH have been the focus of attention and assistance programs since the signing of the 
DPA in late 1995. Initially under UN mandate, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) 
mentored, inspected and monitored the work of the local police. With view to the increasing role of 
the EU in the region, the mandate was handed over in 2003 to the European Union Police Mission 
(EUPM). Its mission statement says that ‘as a part of a broader rule of law approach […]’ it will 
‘establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia and Herzegovina ownership in 
accordance with best European and international practices, and thereby raising current BiH police 
standards.’87 Two of its four mission objectives directly pertain to the fight against corruption: 
 
a. The development of police independence and accountability through de-politicizing the 
police by safeguarding the operational autonomy of the Police Commissioners and the 
political functions of the Ministers, and the enhancement of recruitment, disciplinary and 
dismissal procedures; 
 
b. The fight against organized crime and corruption through establishment of police co-
operation with neighboring countries, setting up of institutional relationships between the 
police and the state prosecution and courts, to strengthen investigative techniques, to 
restructure crime departments and to assign police powers to SIPA (see below)88. 
 
In support of its objectives, EUPM runs seven core programs: the Crime Police Program 
(developing investigation capacity in particular in the areas of major organized crime and human 
trafficking), the Criminal Justice Program (supporting the establishment of a modern Court Police), 
the Internal Affairs Program (setting up a BiH-wide reliable and transparent internal control 
system), the Police Administration Program, the Public Order and Security Program, the State 
Border Service Program (aiming at the establishment of a State-level, self-sustaining, professional, 
multi-ethnic Law Enforcement Agency for border control), and the State Information and Protection 
Agency program (aiming at the establishment of a State-level self-sustaining, professional and 
multi-ethnic Law Enforcement Agency to co-ordinate all crime fighting police capabilities)89.  
 
As EUPM has a monitoring and advisory function, its success relies heavily on the political will and 
support of the Bosnian authorities. A report says: ‘Political resistance is […] likely to occur when 
addressing issues such as the relationship between political and police bodies; transparent 
procedures in recruitment and promotions; ethnic balance […]’. And: ‘In this sense, EUPM will 
count on the closest support from OHR.’90 Nine years into working with the local police, this 
                                                 
86 OSCE equally had concerns about the reappointment process. While questioning (internally) the 
reappointment of certain judges, OSCE nevertheless decided that the independence of the reappointment body 
would be negatively affected if an international organization vetoed its decisions. 
87 See http://www.eupm.org/stories/PPIOreview2003.pdf  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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appears to be a rather bleak assessment. It is echoed by the findings of the EC-commissioned 
functional review of the police and state border service, which concludes that: ‘[…] the police 
forces of BiH are currently not prepared for a (European) future. The existing police activities do 
not properly address important problems such as organized crime, terrorism, […] and victim care 
programs.’91 
 
Referring to the findings in the functional review, the High Representative established by decision 
in July 2004 the Police Restructuring Commission. The Commission issued its recommendations in 
December 2004. They are based on three tenets: 1) the state-level has the sole competence and 
authorities to deal with police matters; 2) size, shape and location of the police are to be determined 
by technical criteria; 3) the police should be free from political influence. Although it has not yet 
been decided whether an Interior Ministry at State-level will be established or whether the 
authorities of the existing Ministry of Security will be widened, these are radical proposals for BiH, 
not least because their implementation will strengthen State-level institutions to the detriment of 
entity-level ones. And based on the premise that control over the police should be exerted by 
citizens, not politicians, the reform package also suggests the creation of police councils, involving 
citizens in annual planning of the police in their respective geographic area of responsibility. 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 
International actors responsible for the overall reform of the legislation and the judiciary (see 
below) have tried to closely involve the Ministries of Justice. However, in some way the 
international actors temporarily took over what are traditionally the roles of MoJs. This was due not 
least to the fact that there was a general lack of local political will to advance necessary reforms. 
With the attempt to establish the independence of the judiciary, there is now clearly a need for a re-
definition of the MoJ’s roles and mandates. In 2002, DfID carried out a review of the MoJs as part 
of their Strategy on Safety, Security and Access to Justice. The report recommended a strengthening 
of the legal capacity of MoJs and in particular their legislative drafting capacities. DfID is currently 
carrying out a project to assist MoJs in both entities and selected cantons to increase their capacities 
in policy making and of linking different elements of the justice sector.  
Ministry of Security 
The State-level Ministry of Security comprises the State Information and Protection Agency 
(SIPA), the State Border Service (SBS) and the National Contact Bureau of Interpol. SIPA was set 
up in 2004, after the Law on the establishment of a State -level Information and Protection Agency 
(SIPA) was adopted in 2002. SIPA’s objectives are, inter alia, to tackle major and organized crime - 
such as terrorism, trafficking, drug smuggling and financial crime. The establishment of SIPA is the 
result of a wider reform effort to downsize and consolidate the Bosnian security sector and as a 
result, the two entity level intelligence agencies, OBS (RS) and FOSS (FBiH) were dismantled at 
the beginning of 2005.  
 
SIPA is being supported through bi-lateral donors and the EC’s CARDS program. Additional 
funding – approximately 40 million KM for 2005 – should come from the state budget; yet, no such 
allocation has been made yet. This has obviously an impact on the effectiveness of SIPA as a whole.  
 
A special Witness Protection Department is expected to be established within the agency92, and 
EUPM is providing training on the subject. Further, a Financial Intelligence Unit has been 
established within SIPA for the prevention and investigation of money laundering.  
                                                 
91 http://www.delbih.cec.eu.int/en/worddocuments/word262.htm  
92 http://www.eupm.org/stories/Article15.htm  
CMI REPORT CORRUPTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – 2005 R 2005: 8 
 37 
Customs and Taxes 
The Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO) was established in 1996 with funding from the 
EC to assist the Bosnian authorities in the implementation of customs related aspects of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. CAFAO expanded its program in 1997 to include taxation. It is widely 
considered to have been the most successful attempt to crack down on organized crime and 
corruption and to highlight the damage it did to the reconstruction process93.  
 
Complying with the 2003 recommendations of the European Commission’s Feasibility Study, the 
Bosnian authorities had by late 2004 adopted all Indirect Taxation Laws at State level, thereby 
abolishing sixteen entity and district level laws or decrees on indirect taxation. In January 2005, the 
Law on Value Added Tax was adopted, which also complies with EU standards. This means that 
now the ‘same indirect tax rates, rules, enforcement regulations and payment system operate across 
the whole of BiH 94’, thereby removing barriers to business development. This new legislative 
framework has, for example, resolved the problem of double taxation, which had been a major 
stumbling block to investment.  
 
In 2003, a single Indirect Tax Authority (ITA – Uprava za indirektno oporezivanje/UIO)95, 
including a single merged customs administration, has been established. The ITA is responsible for 
collecting and administering of all indirect taxes, including customs duties and value added tax. 
Revenues are administered through a newly established single revenue account (legislated by the 
Single Account Law which entered into force on 1 January 2005). Sweden is funding the post of the 
Chairman of the Governing Board of ITA96. 
 
When initiating the work leading to the adoption of the above mentioned reform package, the High 
Representative explicitly mentioned, among other objectives, that one of the Principles for Reform 
of Customs and Introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) was to ‘effectively tackle fraud and 
corruption’ 97.  
 
Already in 2004, the customs revenues collected through the ITA and the single customs authority 
had grown by 12% or approximately 50 million KM98. Since neither purchasing power nor 
expenditure by citizens has increased, this rise in revenue is attributed to growing financial 
discipline resulting from stricter controls 99. For 2005, the ITA has predicted revenue of 1, 9 billion 
KM100. Other reforms concerned the closure of economically unjustifiable customs offices; it is 
hoped that in this way, resources can be set free to ensure a better pay level across the customs 
administration. A further reform concerned the centralization of customs offices for certain types of 
goods in order to prevent arbitrariness and fraud. So was, for example, the clearance of customs for 
textiles centralized to 8 customs offices instead of being covered by all 120 offices.  
 
The EU CARDS program is, through CAFAO, providing assistance to the ITA. This assistance 
addresses material needs of the ITA (computerization, equipment) and provides technical assistance 
aimed at making the Agency an efficient, modern and self-sustainable enforcement agency. 
                                                 
93 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/actions/customs.pdf  
94 See OHR Economic Newsletter Vol. 8, Issue 1 January 2005.  
95 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/com03_692_en.pdf  
96 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=33994  
97 http://www.ohr.int/decisions/econdec/default.asp?content_id=29240  
98 http://www.walter.ba/arhiva/br109/interviewcausevic.html  
99 Oslobodenje, 3 February 2005, p. 8 ‘Tužilaštvima prijavljene utaje od sto miliona maraka’ (‘Evasions of 
100 million marks have been reported to the prosecution’) 
100 http://www.oslobodjenje.com.ba/asp/showart.asp?art_id=43266  
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Assistance will be provided throughout 2005, although this assistance will be contracted out in the 
course of the year, most probably to one of the EU member states with sufficient capacity to do this.   
 
Although scope for abuse remains (for example through non-enforcement of tax and duty collection 
from enterprises), these reforms look very promising. Through the introduction of a computerized 
registration system for vehicles and cargo, the possibilities for abuse and manipulation at the Border 
Crossing Points has been dramatically reduced. This does not, however, mean that smuggling will 
suddenly stop; rather, there will be increased attempts of criminals to use smalle r roads to transport 
their goods, circumventing the official crossings. Here, much will depend on the work of the other 
parts of the Bosnian intelligence community, namely SIPA and the SBS; and the State Prosecution. 
CAFAO itself has pointed out that: ‘The Enforcement Sections have yet to demonstrate full self-
sustainability, although, especially in the Federation, the confidence and ability of the authorities to 
fight large customs frauds and corruption is noticeably increasing. The sections still look for support 
from EU-CAFAO in standing up to political, managerial and judicial interference in 
investigations.101 ’  
 
The prosecution in particular appears to be reluctant at best to investigate cases that have been put 
forward with intelligence provided by CAFAO and ITA – in 2004, the FBiH Tax Authority alone 
has forwarded 550 criminal charges to the prosecutors102. And while SIPA is a relatively new 
agency that might not yet have had time to become fully operational, there also seems to be a lack 
of coordination and understanding by those international actors that deal with SIPA’s and the SBS’s 
capacity building that financial crime connected to border crossing activities should be one of the 
major focuses of their activities and that there should be a cooperation with ITA on intelligence 
gathering, analysis and monitoring of progress.  
 
Further concerns are the ongoing recruitment processes for ITA and the single customs 
administration, partly led by the Civil Service Agency. Now that the single account has been 
established (and the impression is that the Bosnian authorities did not fully grasp the extent to 
which this would affect the inflow of cash and their control over it), politicians are trying to 
reorganize their control over the system by influencing the staffing of the ITA; while senior staff 
(such as Assistant Directors) have been appointed in August 2004, recruitment of other personnel 
has been lagging behind. The international community has chosen not to interfere in this process, 
thereby losing some of the institutional memory of CAFAO, which could have prevented the 
appointment of people that were known to having obstructed the system, or which could have 
advised on the establishment of vetting procedures (currently, even officers whose files have been 
forwarded to the State Prosecutor can apply and be admitted to the service). This recruitment 
process yet again gives preferences to political allies to the detriment of skilled, competent experts 
who are left outside the system.  
 
CAFAO does expect that pressure from the region, in particular neighboring countries, will 
facilitate progress. Equally, membership of the World Customs Organization (WCO), which BiH is 
expected to join this year, should facilitate improvements103. 
                                                 
101 Quoted from comments on the Inter-Agency Rule of Law reform matrix, provided by OSCE during 
January 2005 field trip.  
102 Oslobodenje, 3 February 2005, p. 8 ‘Tužilaštvima prijavljene utaje od sto miliona maraka’ (‘Evasions of 
100 million marks have been reported to the prosecution’) 
103 Information given during interview with informant in BiH.  
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Legislative Reform and Reform of the Judiciary 
Legislative Reform 
A new Criminal Law and a new Criminal Procedure Law were imposed by the High Representative 
in early 2003. Both laws are crucial in that they provide the basis to fight corruption and organized 
crime in BiH. One of the criticisms of the new Criminal Procedure Law is that it allows for plea 
bargaining104, which is seen by many as providing ample scope for abuse in the way sentences are 
issued. 
 
Also in early 2003, the High Representative imposed a Witness Protection Program, consisting of a 
package of new legislation105 and amendments106 to existing legislation, with the aim of providing 
essential protection for vulnerable witnesses or those under threat during criminal proceedings. The 
program is to be implemented by SIPA, but progress is very slow indeed, due to a lack of 
manpower, training and resources.  
 
The Council of Ministers adopted in 2003 an Action Plan to fight organized crime. It also adopted a 
package of 8 bills , including a bill to prevent money laundering.   
 
A State-level Law on Conflict of Interest in Governmental Institutions was imposed by the High 
Representative in 2002107. It contains a Code of Conduct for elected officials, executive 
officeholders and advisors in the exercise of their official duties and various provisions on 
incompatibility of public office with ‘serving on the management board, steering board, supervisory 
board, executive board, or acting in the capacity of an authorised person of a public enterprise’ and 
‘serving on the management board or directorate, or as director, of a privatisation agency’ 108. It also 
contains provisions on the acceptance of gifts (fixing the threshold for the acceptance of gifts that 
do not have to be reported at 20 KM), and on asset disclosure. Following the introduction of the law 
at State-level, the authorities were required to introduce legislation at entity level, regulating 
Conflict of Interest for the local levels of government. Although draft laws now exist, their quality 
is said to be poor, and there is a likelihood of the Election Commission – the body in charge of 
overseeing the implementation of the Law – making proposals for an entirely new law, which 
would embrace all levels of government. Effective implementation of the Law so far was also made 
difficult by the lack of adequate resources within the Election Commission109. Transparency 
International – through grants from the Finnish government – has been active in the promotion and 
provision of training on the law since 2003110. Article 16 of the Civil Service Law regulates Conflict 
of Interest for civil servants111.  
 
A Law on Freedom of Access to Information, which entered into force in 2000, is intended, inter 
alia, to ‘acknowledge that information in control of public authorities is a valuable public resource 
                                                 
104 ‘Plea bargaining - the process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a 
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's 
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return 
for a lighter sentence than that possible for the graver charge.’ Quoted from: 
 http://www.the3rdjudicialdistrict.com/glossary.htm  
105 The Laws on Witness Protection and Judicial Police of BiH.  
106 Amendments to the existing Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and the Law on the Court of BiH.  
107 See http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=8568  
108 See http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/oth-legist/doc/LAW-ON-CONFLICT -OF-INTEREST.doc  
109 Information about the state of implementation of the Conflict of Interest Law for Elected Officials at 
www.izbori.ba 
110 See http://www.ti-bih.org/en-GB/Default.aspx?TabID=19  
111 See http://www.ads.gov.ba/en/laws/June%202002%20-%20Law%20on%20Civil%20Service.pdf  
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and that public access to such information promotes greater transparency and accountability of 
those authorities, and is essential to the democratic process112’. At the end of 2004, Transparency 
International organized a repeat survey of the status of implementation of the Law on Freedom of 
Access to Information. Requests for information were sent to public agencies and institutions at all 
levels. TI concluded that no progress had been made since 2003, since 46% of all agencies missed 
the deadline of 15 days stipula ted by the law, a worse result than in the previous survey113. No data 
is available on how often citizens have requested information under the Law.  
 
A Law on Public Procurement – drafted in the framework of an EC program and part of the 
requirements of the EC feasibility study114 - was adopted in September 2004 by the Bosnian 
authorities and entered into force in November 2004. It provides uniform regulations across the 
country and is in line with EU and international standards. Secondary legislation is currently being 
drafted. The Public Procurement Agency (PPA) and the Procurement Review Body (PRB) will be 
in charge of monitoring the procurement process, gathering information and ensuring compliance 
with the provisions set out in the Law. While the existence of a firm legislative and regulatory 
framework for public procurement is a crucial precondition for reform in this area, there is also 
scope for scepticism, since officials that abused the previous system will be in charge of decisions 
on tenders under the new legislation. It is therefore paramount that both the PPA and the PRB 
receive sufficient support to act independently. Projects such as the Governance Accountability 
Project co-funded by Sida (see below) will now monitor how the Bosnian beneficiaries apply the 
provisions under the new legislation in practice.   
Reform of the Judiciary  
The OHR created a Judicial Reform Working Group in 1998. However, this group failed to provide 
overall coordination and guidance for all ongoing programs and projects in the area of judicial 
reform. Nor did OHR’s 1999 Comprehensive Judicial Reform Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
deliver what its title promised.  
 
In mid-1998, the Judicial System Assessment Program (JSAP) was launched under the auspices of 
the United Nations Mission in BiH (UNMiBH).  
 
JSAP worked on analyzing and assessing the existing judicial system. It was followed, in January 
2001, by the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC), which operated until March 2004 and was 
funded by a variety of international donors115. IJC was created to sustain judicial reform and to 
promote the rule of law, to guide and co-ordinate judicial reform activities within BiH and to advise 
and assist judicial, prosecutorial and related institutions; the IJC had specific authorization to ensure 
that Commissions and Councils complied with their legal obligations. Until mid-2002, the IJC 
reported directly to the High Representative, after that, to a newly appointed Deputy High 
Representative in charge of the Rule of Law. IJC coordinated its activities with the OHR Legal 
Reform Unit - which dealt with the drafting of procedural laws and other laws in the judicial reform 
sector - and the Criminal Institutions and Prosecutorial Reform Unit (CIPRU), a unit that came out 
of the OHR’s Anti-Fraud Department. CIPRU is in charge of the restructuring of the prosecutorial 
                                                 
112 See SIGMA, Public Administration Profile Bosnian and Herzegovina/State Level, Paris 2004, at 
http://www.sigmaweb.org/PDF/PAPROFILES/Balkans_04/SIGMAPAPROF_BiH_State_04E.pdf 
113 See TI BiH 2004 Activity Report at http://www.ekaan.com/tibih/Izvještaj%20%20TI%20BiH-
a%20za%202004.%20godinu.pdf  
114 ‘Technical assistance to the establishment of a Public Procurement Framework in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina/Phase II’ by the European Union’s Public Procurement Program for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(EUPPP) 
115 The IJC was primarily funded by the EC and the US; Norway also contributed substantial funds. A number 
of bi-lateral donors – including Sida – provided funding for various specific projects.  
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system, as well as the establishment of the Court and Prosecutor’s Office and the restructuring of 
other institutions in the criminal justice system.  
 
The IJC’s two primary goals were the improvement of the independence of the judiciary and the 
improvement of the quality and efficiency of the judicial system. It aimed to achieve these 
objectives, inter alia, through the removal of unsuitable judges and prosecutors through a 
comprehensive review process; the establishment of a fair, objective and transparent appointment 
process for judges and prosecutors; the restructuring of the Commissions and Councils; the creation 
of adequate security for individual judges and prosecutors and for court buildings, and improved 
funding of the judiciary.  
 
The re-appointment process, which replaced the previously introduced Comprehensive Review 
Process that was considered to have failed, was introduced in 2001, and required all judges and 
prosecutors to reapply for their posts in an open competition. It was argued that through screening 
of all applications according to a previously established procedure with set criteria, incompetent or 
partial judges or prosecutors could be filtered out of the system. The reappointment process was to 
be overseen by an appointment body which had international and national participation and which 
was to replace the existing Councils and Commissions (see HJPC below). By the end of March 
2004, 878 appointments had been made and 73 vacancies had to be re-advertised because of the 
lack of suitable candidates or an insufficient number of candidates from the required ethnic group. 
Approximately 30% of the incumbent judges and prosecutors had not been reappointed in the 
process, although not necessarily because they had failed to pass the procedure, but because they 
either did not reapply, withdrew their application or had reached retirement age.  
 
It is difficult to measure any immediate improvement in the quality of the work of judges and 
prosecutors. The IJC’s final report believes that this process has been an ‘effective vehicle for 
change’, primarily because it introduced standard procedures that had to be undergone. That there 
was scope for abuse, i.e. the re-appointment of unsuitable candidates, is confirmed by the need for 
IJC intervention in a number of cases. The IJC also notes that there was considerable resistance and 
reluctance by politicians to accept this process, mainly because it meant that politicians lost control 
over it. ‘[…] while they understood the concept of judicial independence, it was not something to 
which they subscribed. The only way that a non-politicized appointment process based on merit 
could be achieved would be to take the process entirely out of the hands of the executive and 
legislature.116’ 
 
In order to improve future appointments and disciplinary measures, three High Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Councils (HJPC)117 were created, one for each entity and one for the state level that 
also covers Brcko. In May 2000, the High Representative imposed the HJPC Laws establishing the 
legislative and institutional framework within which the HJPCs could operate. In order to ensure 
impartiality and to provide a counterbalance to the local reluctance to assume ownership and to take 
unpopular decisions, the HJPCs consist of local and international representatives. The creation of 
one single, state-level HJPC  was done in 2004 and is seen as the only way to guarantee uniformity 
of standards of appointment, ethical conduct and discipline. Although the entity prime ministers 
have been tasked since 2002 to negotiate a process that would transfer competence to a single 
HJPC, nothing happened until the High Representative in June 2003 appointed the then IJC director 
as facilitator of this process. 
 
New Judicial Service Laws provided for substantial salary increases to judges and prosecutors. The 
rationale was that the judiciary was not independent and was prone to influence peddling partly 
                                                 
116 See Final Report of the Independent Judicial Commission, November 2004, p. 49 
117 See also http://www.hjpc.ba/intro/?cid=246,1,1  
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because of their poor remuneration. Appropriate salaries where seen as one way to encourage 
judicial independence. Between 2000 and 2004, salaries in the Federation rose by 37% and in the 
RS by 42%, whereas the average net salary rose less than 10%. Judges and prosecutors also retained 
benefits inherited from the Yugoslav period. Salaries ranged from ca. 1800 KM a month for RS 
Basic Court judges to ca. 3500 KM a month for Federation Supreme Court judges. The additional 
funds had to be found in the budgets of the courts and prosecutors’ officers. However, the 
governments were unable to sustain this through budgeting properly. The IJC interpreted this as a 
lack of genuine interest in the establishment of an independent judiciary.118 As a result, the IJC and 
OHR introduced new legislation that provided a different basis for calculating salary increases. 
There was also a freeze on rises until 2007.  
 
The argument of low salaries being in direct correlation to the corruptness of the officer has been 
made elsewhere (be it in the police, health care, judiciary). However, most evidence suggests that an 
increase in salary has had a short-term effect, only. In the medium and long-term it has done 
nothing to decrease bribery in the structures in question. In BiH, the concerns about partiality of 
judges remain high; and even the higher than average salaries have done nothing to change this 
picture significantly.  
 
The BiH State Court and the State level Prosecutor’s Office were established in January 2003 
through amendments to the Law on the Court of BiH and the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office. These 
amendments limit the jurisdiction of the State Court to cases that are deemed to have substantial 
detrimental effect to BiH and to the competencies defined by the Bosnian constitution. This 
jurisdiction was deliberately defined in such a way as to assist in the capture and prosecution of the 
most serious criminal cases, including war crimes, corruption and organized crime on an inter-entity 
level119.  
 
The BiH Prosecutor’s Office has seven international prosecutors120. It is supported by four Anti-
Crime and Corruption Units, which are headed by additional international prosecutors121. The role of 
the international staff is to ‘shadow’, monitor and support the work of national prosecutors. As 
Bosnian prosecutors would be put under substantial political pressure and intimidations, the 
presence of international prosecutors is, for the moment, one of the few guarantees that sensitive 
cases are being taken up at all122. However, there is substantial psychological pressure and threats of 
physical violence to these international prosecutors123, too, giving an idea of both the political 
interests at stake in the cases they are investigating and the extent of intimidation that local staff 
would be exposed to. Since international prosecutors cannot be there forever, this again poses the 
question as to sustainability of the structures created and the real success in achieving independence 
of the judiciary and enforcement institutions. In addition, it is worth noting that the State Court will 
deal exclusively with major cases. Smaller cases will continue to be dealt with at municipal/district 
or cantonal levels, i.e. levels without international supervision and, hence, without the same 
pressure to either open cases or to prosecute them according to the standards set by the legislation.  
                                                 
118 Ibid. p. 116 
119 Funding for the establishment of the State Court and the Prosecutor’s office, including reconstruction work 
on their permanent premises, were provided by the US, Spain and the EC.  
120 Sida has funded one Swedish prosecutor to the State Prosecutors Office 
121 The OHR’s Anti-Crime and Corruption Unit (ACCU), which is part of the Rule of Law Pillar, provides the 
support and liaison between OHR and the Prosecutor’s Office. ACCU is expected to be phased out by the end 
of 2005, but it is planned to continue the presence of International Prosecutors in the short- and medium-term. 
Sida is currently funding two investigators to this unit.  
122 It has to be added that the international staff faces substantial threats to their security, too, and is provided 
with special security arrangements at all times.  
123 See, for example http://www.css.ba/en/izbor.asp?kat=news&godina=2004#90 on threats to 
international and local prosecutors.  
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As with judges, prosecutors have a knowledge and skills gap on how to deal with crimes involving 
financial transactions/aspects. More targeted training would be needed on this issue to increase the 
capacity of the prosecution to efficiently deal with such cases124.  
 
A number of projects and initiatives have dealt with court administration and court security through 
technical upgrading of the courts and with the introduction of computerized case registrations and 
tracking systems. Many of these projects were carried out by the International Criminal 
Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), which is part of the US Department of 
Justice. By improving the technical standards and infrastructure in the courts, it aims to 
substantially reduce excuses for case backlogs etc. However, there has been no assessment of 
whether there has been a substantive improvement in the situation.  
 
UN IPTF and now EUPM have also assisted RS and Federation police in establishing efficient 
Court Police capable of providing adequate security for judges, prosecutors and judges in the court 
buildings. The Federation Court Police is providing temporary assistance to the Court of BiH until a 
Court Police can be established at State level. Again, a comprehensive assessment of the impact of 
these measures has not been made. Many international interlocutors are skeptical. Intimidation is 
frequent, and courts still seem often to lack basic security equipment (video recording etc.). Case 
files are known to disappear, as there are no sufficient safeguards in place to control (and restrict) 
access to filing cabinets etc.  
 
In the area of Public Administration Reform, currently, there are four laws regulating the public 
administration125 in BiH, but efforts are underway to harmonize these laws and thus provide greater 
clarity and transparency on responsibilities and competencies.  
 
Established in 2003, the Bosnian Civil Service Agency is the institution in charge of personnel 
policy in the public administration at state level126. One of its tasks is to establish and implement 
transparent recruitment procedures. However, there is criticism as to how successful this task is 
being accomplished, for example in the case of the recruitment process for the Indirect Taxation 
Authority (ITA)127. 
Auditing 
External Audit/State Audit Institutions  
To date, no audit or control structure for internal oversight of the public administration exists. 
Financial audit and control – including that of the public administration – is undertaken by the State 
Audit Office, whose work is governed by the Law on Auditing of Institutions of BiH. The Law 
authorizes the Office to make sure a) that ‘all reasonable measures are taken to ensure the collection 
and proper management of revenues of the institutions of BiH; b) that payments out of revenues, 
including non-budgetary finances, are executed with appropriate authorization and for the purpose 
earmarked; and c) that all reasonable precautions to ensure receiving, keeping, and us ing of state 
                                                 
124 Information given during interview with informant in BiH.  
125 The Civil Service Law, the BiH Law on Administration, the Law on the Council of Ministers and the BiH 
Law on Ministries 
126 There is also a RS Civil Service Agency, which started its operations in 2002; the establishment of a 
Federation Civil Service Agency is underway; see 
http://www.sigmaweb.org/PDF/PAPROFILES/Balkans_04/SIGMAPAPROF_BiH_Fed_04E.pdf 
127 Information given during interview with informant in BiH. 
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reserves are taken128’. Among the Office’s strategic objectives are to: ‘ensure transparency of public 
spending by presentation of audit reports to the Parliament, media and general public; increase 
responsible expenditure of public funds by carrying out audit of financial systems, reports, 
transactions; increase the quality and reliability of financial processes through recommendations to 
bodies that affect budget management; ensure legitimacy of public fund users, identify deviations 
and suggest corrective measures; provide information to the Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers through submitting reports; and increase public confidence in the state institutions 129.’  
 
The State Audit Office came about through pressure from the World Bank, which made its 
establishment a pre-requisite for the granting of loans; donors have been instrumental in building 
the institutions. At present, Sweden is supporting the work of the State Audit Office through 
funding an auditor seconded from the Swedish Riksrevisionen (the Swedish State Audit Institution), 
who is in charge of training the national staff (consisting of the Auditor-General and two deputies, 
seven civil servants, and administrative and technical staff). The State Audit Office has had some 
impressive results (see, for example, the 2003 audits of the three electricity providers referred to in 
the previous part of this report). However, the auditors are frequently prevented from exercising 
their tasks, and exposed to substantial political pressure and intimidation. Entity governments have, 
for example, withheld funding after damning reports had been tabled. And many of the Office’s 
reports or their recommendations are not taken any further130, although the State Prosecutor’s Office 
can, on the basis of the reports, launch criminal proceedings.  
Economic Reforms  
The Law on [Private Sector] Accounting and Auditing was adopted in 2004, with the aim at 
establishing mandatory accounting and auditing standards and introducing a professional code of 
ethics of auditors for the entire BiH. If harmonized on the entity (and Brcko district) level, it will 
address criticism previously voiced over accounting and auditing standards in BiH and bring the 
system in line with international and EU standards131. USAID – the lead donor for economic reform 
– has been supporting these initiatives, inter alia through the promotion and training of accountants 
and auditors, and reforms of the respective university curricula.  
Public Utilities  
Where they addressed systemic and structural issues, part of the recommendations from the 2003 
audits of the electricity suppliers contributed to the drafting by the OHR of a new Law on Public 
Enterprises, which has been passed in the RS, and, very recently (February 2005) in the Federal 
Parliament. Inter alia, it spells out incompatibilities of managerial functions and membership in 
executive organs, conflict of interest, procurement rules, and internal and external audit 
provisions 132. The 2003 audits also led to a number of criminal investigations conducted by the State 
Prosecutor’s Office. However, there are still concerns about the running of public utilities: the High 
Representative has recently ordered audits in key enterprises; and a specific Public Utilities Unit is 
operating within the OHR’s Economic Department’s Economic Pillars Unit. 
                                                 
128 See SIGMA, Public Administration Profile Bosnian and Herzegovina/State Level, Paris 2004, at 
http://www.sigmaweb.org/PDF/PAPROFILES/Balkans_04/SIGMAPAPROF_BiH_State_04E.pdf 
129 Ibid. 
130 This is a situation that can be observed in other transitional countries, too, for example in Poland.  
131 The measures aim at establishing a system based on four prime principles: 1) independence and integrity of 
the accounting and auditing profession; 2) self-regulation, according to internationally accepted and enforced 
standards; 3) protection of the public; and 4) continuous improvement of standards. See OHR Economic 
Newsletter Vol. 8, Issue 1 January 2005.  
132 For the text of the Law on Public Enterprises in the Federation BiH, see Official Gazette of FBiH, Number 
8, page 299, 9 February 2005.  
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Business Registration Reform 133 
A State Framework Law on Business Registration entered into force in September 2004. Its 
objective was to harmonize State and Entity (and Brcko District) legislation with EU standards and 
to ensure a fast and uniform process of business registration at all levels for both domestic and 
foreign businesses. However, harmonization with the State Law is now required at entity level, a 
process that is going painstakingly slowly. In the RS, the draft Business Legislation Law was 
adopted at the end of December 2004. In the Federation, the Draft Law has not yet been presented 
to the Government. It is feared that a further delay will send negative signals to potential foreign 
investors and b) negatively impact the World Bank’s Business Environment Adjustment Credit, one 
of the conditions for which is this reform134.  
‘Bulldozer’-Process/Initiative 
The so-called ‘Bulldozer’-Process/Initiative was launched by the High Representative in November 
2002. It aims at dismantling ‘barriers to business growth and job creation’ with the intention to ‘to 
knock down as many roadblocks and cut as much red tape […] to free up the economy for 
growth’135. In the three phases of the Initiative, stakeholders from local business associations, 
regional development agencies, chambers of commerce, employers’ associations and foreign 
investors’ associations were consulted on which reforms they believed were necessary to bring 
about change in the economic climate. As a result of the initial information collected, six Regional 
Bulldozer Committees and one national one on agriculture were established. These committees 
launched into collecting more detailed information from business people on obstacles to doing 
business in BiH. This information was then translated into reform proposals that were presented to 
the government. Phase II also saw the formation by the two entity prime ministers of the so-called 
Emergency Reform Units, led by the appropriate ministries and tasked with overseeing the adoption 
and coordination of the reforms that followed. While Phase I and II of the process was led and 
coordinated by the OHR, at the end of 2004, the leadership of Phase III was gradually handed over 
to the newly established Association of Employers of BiH. The Association is now in charge of 
creating publicity and support among the public and parliamentarians for 50 reform proposals in 
order to ensure their swift adoption. Overall, 150 economic reforms will have been proposed in the 
framework of this Initiative, some of which have been taken on board in the framework of, for 
example, the passage of new indirect taxation legislation.  
 
Maybe equally important is the establishment of a public – private sector dialogue on the entity 
level, which will now have to be maintained and brought to the state level. Efforts are underway to 
create such a Social and Economical Council at state level136.  
 
The Bulldozer-Initiative and the Business Registration Reform work on the assumption that by 
cutting red tape and thus reducing the number of institutions that an entrepreneur-to-be has to deal 
with, opportunities for corruption would be cut. However, there has to be a level of caution against 
such approaches: having less regulations can equally result in increasing opportunities for 
corruption. Again, a balance has to be struck between facilitation of economic growth through 
cutting obstacles for businesses and retaining an appropriate level of control over business to avoid 
abuse and corruption.  
                                                 
133 Activities in support of this reform are funded by the UK Department for International Development 
(DfID). 
134 See OHR Economic Newsletter. Vol. 8, Issue 1 January 2005.  
135 See OHR Press Release http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/econ/bulldozer-
initiative/default.asp?content_id=28712  
136 See OHR Economic Newsletter Vol. 8, Issue 1 January 2005.  
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Privatization 
Little has been achieved by way of progress in the privatization process. The fact that, for example, 
the Federation authorities have not yet started to look for a replacement for the head and deputy 
head of the Federation’s Privatization Agency, whose terms expire in early spring 2005, shows that 
there is no real sense of urgency in the Federation government to move this issue seriously forward. 
Equally alarming appear efforts in the FBiH government to continue with the adoption of 
amendments to existing laws and new laws in the area of privatization. These foresee, among other, 
the auditing of already privatized enterprises and of enterprises earmarked for privatization. This 
would result in legal uncertainty and thus put off potential foreign investors.  
Public Sector Service Delivery Reforms 
Public Utilities 
USAID is funding activities in the water sector. The aim is to assist the management boards of 
water providers to become independent public corporations that are free from interference by 
municipal and other authorities. This is done through making the boards financially self-sustaining 
and enabling them to achieve autonomy for self-control and management. It is hoped that this will 
put an end to the siphoning off of funds to high-ranking party officials.137 
 
Also funded by USAID is the Public Sector Accounting Project, which promotes accountability and 
transparency through the development of automated accounting and budget execution systems for 
all levels of government. The project establishes an internal control capacity as any spending is 
immediately recorded and expenditure is being kept track of. This makes audits easier and 
establishes individual accountability.  
Local Self-Governance reform  
The Law on Local Self-Governance, which is based on the European Charter of Local Self-
Government, was adopted by the House of Representatives on 17 January 2005, and should be on 
the agenda for adoption by the Federal Parliament in one of the forthcoming sessions; it was 
adopted by the RS Parliament in September 2004. However, the Constitutional Commission has not 
adopted the law’s amendments, and it is anticipated that further complications lie ahead. The law is 
particularly unpopular in the Federation, as it will strengthen the local level to the detriment of the 
cantonal level, from where the strongest resistance originates. While politicians on the local level 
from whatever party seem to be very positive about the law, the nationalist leadership at the 
cantonal level is not.  
 
In addition to better regulating the transfer of budgetary funds to the local level and thus giving 
local authorities the means to finance expenditures that fall under their competencies (such as, for 
example, primary education), this law is important in the context of the fight against corruption in 
that it tries:  
· to implement the principle that, where possible, public responsibilities shall generally be 
exercised by those authorities that are closest to the citizen; 
· to foster accountability of the local self-government to the citizens by making governance 
processes more transparent; 
· to increase the participation of citizens in policy making at the local level through 
referendums, civic initiatives etc.   
                                                 
137 Information leaflet by USAID ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina Anti-Corruption efforts’, www.usaid.ba  
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OSCE – not the national authorities – plan public discussions about the Law and its Amendments 
throughout BiH over a period of 60 days.  
 
Sida, together with USAID, is funding the Governance Accountability Project (GAP), a 3 year 
project (which started in July 2004 and is expected to last until 2007) targeting a total of 40 
municipalities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of the project is to improve ‘the 
capacity of a critical mass of municipalities to better serve their citizens within a policy and fiscal 
framework of good governance’. GAP will train local authorities in a number of innovative 
approaches to service delivery, such as One-Stop-Shops for obtaining certificates, which will 
dramatically reduce the need of citizens to approach several offices of the local public 
administration and thus also reduce the opportunities for rent seeking by different local public 
servants. Interestingly, the response to the project by the local mayors was very positive, but 
whether that is the case at the lower level of local government is disputable. The project will also try 
to make a number of policy interventions that affect local self-governance, specifically in 
supporting the adoption and implementation of the Law on Local Self-Governance, the elaboration 
of a Local Debt Law and clarifications of the regulations on Value-Added Tax. At the moment, for 
example, it is not clear how revenues collected by the Indirect Taxation Authority would benefit the 
municipal level.  
Media reforms 
Since the signing of the DPA in 1995, funds in excess of US$ 40 million138 have gone into support 
of the media in BiH. This support has undoubtedly facilitated the development of free and 
independent media in the country and has de-politicized the public broadcasters. However, with 
currently 187 registered media for a population of approximately 4 million139, quantity has 
dominated over quality140. The Bosnian market is too small for such a large number of media. Since 
many are still dependent on foreign assistance, with the continuing reduction of international 
support, it can be expected that a substantial number will be unable to survive 141. Others can, 
however, be expected to make a successful transition to independence142.  
 
International support has, it appears, done little to improve the quality of journalism143. A first wave 
of change in journalistic reporting came as a result of the de-criminalization of defamation in 2001, 
                                                 
138 Aggregate figures are difficult to come by; the estimate results from an approximated US$ 20 Million that 
has gone into the establishment and support of OBN and another US$ 20 Million into the restructuring of 
public service broadcasting, including the establishment of the Independent Media Commission (IMC) and 
the creation of the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) as well as init ial support to RTRS, Radio 
FERN and Mreža. The figure does not include funding that has gone into training of journalists, as no such 
data has been available.  
139 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html#People  
140 For comparison, the United Kingdom has ca. 950 media for a population of ca. 70 Million. See 
http://www.wrx.zen.co.uk/britnews.htm and 
http://www.wrx.zen.co.uk/fromhere.htm 
141 Such as the Banja Luka based Nezavisne Novine (Independent Newspaper), with a circulation of just 
15.000 (weekdays) and 20.000 (Saturdays), or the Sarajevo-based TV station Studio 99.  
142 Such as the Banja Luka based ATV or the Travnik regional radio station TNT that have made a successful 
transition to become commercial broadcasters. 
143 Sida, together with other donors, has supported the work of the Press Council, a self-regulatory body 
established in 2000, consisting of journalists, the public and the international community to oversee the 
application of the Press Code (See: 
http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/text%20versions/special%20files%20bosnia/Press_Code.doc), which stresses 
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making slander and libel civil offenses144. This opened the door to the sensationalist reporting, often 
not based on facts, which currently pervades in the media. More and more politicians and the public 
are becoming aware of the provisions of the new Libel Law and there are a rising number of actual 
libel cases against journalists resulting in civil penalties (fines). So, the pendulum might slowly 
swing back and facilitate a more responsible reporting. It is, however, too early to clearly identify 
this as a trend.  
 
While countless topical training programs were and are offered to journalists, they had little impact 
on increasing journalistic standards. In late 2004, the Sarajevo-based Mediacentar145, co-funded by 
the BBC and the Open Society Institute, launched a competitive scholarship program on 
investigative techniques for reporting on organized crime for print media journalists from the 
region. However, it has been unable to find sufficient interest for this course. This is probably not 
because the topic is too sensitive or too dangerous for journalists. Rather, there appears to be simply 
no strong sense of a need for training and improvement of skills, or of better qualifications leading 
to better employability or higher pay. There is certainly also an element of fatigue with existing 
assistance models, such as workshops and trainings; and donors may have spoiled their target 
group: journalists will not come to events unless the costs of these are fully covered by the donor.  
 
Finally, progress on the establishment of a genuinely independent State Broadcasting System as 
requested by the EC feasibility study is still very slow. The issue of financing the broadcasters 
through the collection of fees remains a serious concern. Equally, politicians appear to not yet have 
fully seized the concept and implications of an independent public broadcasting system.  
4.3 Explicit responses 
General 
As mentioned earlier, there have been relatively few explicit anti-corruption efforts. In early 1999, 
the OHR issued ‘A comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina’146, This 
was centered around so-called ‘strategic pillars’: ‘Education and Public Awareness’, ‘Eliminate 
Opportunities’, ‘Transparency and Reporting’, ‘Controls and Penalties’. It also set out sectoral 
reform priorities (such as tax and customs reform, treasury, payment bureaus etc.). While the 
Strategy as such did not have a very long, high-profile life, the majority of the reforms therein have 
been tackled, in the framework of either support to the introduction of the rule of law, economic 
reforms or reforms of the public administration.  
Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS) or Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) 
Largely in response to pressure from the World Bank, and also from other players in the 
International Community, the Bosnian government elaborated a BiH Medium Term Development 
Strategy (or Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper), which was adopted in March 2004 by the Council 
                                                                                                                                                     
ethical standards in journalistic work. No evaluations of the work of the Press Council were available to the 
authors of this paper. The website of the Press Council is http://www.vzs.ba 
144 Before this, arrests of journalists were frequent. See for example the arrests in 1999 of Senad Pecanin and 
Senad Avdic at http://www.ddh.nl/org/poo/bsh/media/history.htm#0999, or 
http://www.mediaonline.ba/en/arhiva/arhiva/pdf/2000/mnbr58en.pdf. The respective RS and FBiH Laws can 
be found at http://www.ti-bih.org/documents/zakoni/   
145 http://www.media.ba/SarajevoBN/News/2004/11/23/News1541/  
146 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/afd/ac-cor-strat/default.asp?content_id=5240  
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of Ministers. It had been preceded in 2002 by an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (or I-
PRSP).  
 
The ‘Strategy for Combating Crime and Corruption’ is an integral part of the MTDS. It is 
complemented by an Anti-Corruption Action Plan. The Strategy is a largely descriptive document, 
in which the Bosnian authorities commit themselves to legislative, institutional and educational 
activities. It outlines broader concerns about good governance and repression of corruption through 
investigation and prosecution, and strengthening the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. The 
Strategy sets out objectives for reforming the public administration and improving the fiscal system, 
as well as for improving transparency in the privatization process.  
 
The Action Plan broadly outlines legislative reforms in the relevant sectors and assigns 
responsibilities to the institutions in charge of advancing these reforms. It also provides timelines 
for their implementation. It does not, however, identify risks or success indicators which could help 
to monitor the implementation of the anti-corruption reforms and assess and/or evaluate their 
impact.  
 
The MTDS/PRSP Unit, an integral part of the State government’s Economic Planning and Policy 
Unit (EPPU), was charged with coordinating the elaboration of the Strategy and the Action Plan. 
This was done through the rather novel mechanism of broad stakeholder consultation, including 
with civil society/NGO representatives. While such an exercise is probably already a success in 
itself, given the government’s general reluctance and lack of experience in public debates, there are 
mixed views on how much genuine consultation has really taken place as opposed to simply 
meeting a donor demand.  
 
The EPPU is also in charge of monitoring the implementation of the overall MTDS. Currently with 
a staff of nine, the EPPU monitors progress in all sectors outlined in the MTDS, and collates and 
submits interim reports to the government. To this end, over 20 Working Groups consisting of 
representatives from the different line ministries and NGO representatives have been set up. The 
Working Groups are involved in the definition of the Action Plans and in the assessment of 
implementation of the reform objectives.  
 
The most recent interim report was presented to the government in December 2004, assessing 
progress made between August 2003 and November 2004 – the first year of the MTDS.147 The 
interim reports will serve as the basis for discussion of the revision of the MTDS and its Action 
Plans in March 2005. The revision process will also set new priorities and formulate further reforms 
and measures to be taken. 
Public Awareness Campaigns 
A Public Awareness Campaign was conducted by OHR in 2000 and in 2001. OHR had 
commissioned the Sarajevo Centre for Contemporary Art to provide cartoons, comics and posters 
for this so called ‘Ovaj and Onaj’-campaign148. The campaign also included radio jingles and TV 
spots. The objective of the two-part campaign was to sensitivise the public to the issue of corruption 
and its cost to society. The campaign has failed for two reasons. Firstly, the campaign is not 
remembered for the subject it raised, but for the its visual implementation, which fell just short of 
insulting citizens by doubting that they could swallow more complex messages. Secondly – and this 
                                                 
147 The interim report is available in the local language version at http://www.eppu.ba.  
148 The campaign title has never been translated into English; roughly, it could be translated as ‘The one here, 
and the one over there’.  
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has been the experience elsewhere in the region149 - the campaign failed because it had no specific 
target issue, but aimed to raise awareness about corruption in a more general way. While it might 
indeed have raised awareness (although people in BiH have always been aware that the problem 
exists), it also provided an anti-climax. Raised awareness results in raised expectations, and these 
expectations need to be met. Yet, public awareness campaigns that are isolated from any real issue 
do not meet expectations; on the contrary, they have the potential to be counterproductive and to 
increase the public’s cynicism150. 
  
Under the slogan: ‘Vote Corruption Away’, another awareness campaign was conducted by the 
OSCE in the run-up to the 2000 elections. Through the dissemination in the print media of around 
200,000 educational brochures and through television advertisements and radio spots, the campaign 
aimed to educate the wider public about the causes and consequences of corruption. It was hoped 
that the topic would become an issue in the election campaign and, eventually, in the way people 
would cast their votes. No assessment or evaluation has been made of the impact that this campaign 
had against the objectives set.  
Transparency International – Local Chapter 
The Bosnian chapter of Transparency International (TI) – an international NGO dedicated to the 
fight against corruption – was established in 2000. It is to date the only local NGO that deals 
specifically and exclusively with corruption. In 2004, TI published the Bosnian National Integrity 
Systems Country Study Report and the Transparency International Corruption Perception Study. TI 
also established its Advocacy and Legal Advice Centre. This incorporates a toll-free phone line to 
report on corruption. After verification of the substance of the claims brought forward by citizens, 
TI either forwards the cases to the Public Prosecutor’s office in the hope of initiating criminal 
investigations, or sends an information letter to the Prosecutor’s office. TI continues to be active in 
promoting and providing training on the Law on Conflict of Interest in Governmental Institutions 
and on the Freedom of Access to Information Act. TI is present in the national media on a regular 
basis through statements on corruption-related issues, and its reports often provoke defensive 
reactions by the institutions that are being criticized151.   
 
Since its establishment in 2000, TI BiH has also been one of the most regular and outspoken critics 
of the role of the international community in general and the OHR in particular. The criticism is 
mainly directed towards what TI perceives as double standards: a lack of transparency and 
accountability and arbitrariness in which decisions are being passed by the OHR. While TI’s 
criticism might be reasonable, the way in which it is delivered is often wanting. But equally, the 
way in which the OHR has reacted to such criticism in the past – mainly by counterattacking the TI 
leadership instead of addressing in a constructive way the points where criticism was justified – has 
not always been helpful. If one of OHR’s long-term policy objectives is the promotion of a vibrant 
civil society as part of a stable democracy, then this should demand a certain confidence in 
interacting with such groups, rather than putting itself above criticism152.  
                                                 
149 Bulgaria is a good example for a counterproductive anti-corruption awareness campaign. When in 2001, 
such a campaign was launched, the perceived level of corruption in Bulgaria soared. The public believed that 
once there was a campaign, the problem must have had dramatically worsened, otherwise there would not 
have been a campaign in the first place.  
150 A detailed discussion on anti-corruption public awareness campaigns and their impact can be found in: 
‘From the Ground Up – Assessing the Record of Anticorruption Assistance in Southeastern Europe’ by 
Martin Tisné and Daniel Smilov, Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, The Soros 
Foundations Network, Budapest, 2004.  
151 For more information on TI BiH’s activities, see its 2004 Annual Activity Report at 
http://www.ekaan.com/tibih/Izvještaj%20%20TI%20BiH-a%20za%202004.%20godinu.pdf  
152 This concerns, for example, the conflict between TI and the then High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch 
in 2001.  
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4.4 International efforts/Regional level 
Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has participated in the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) 
since 2002. SPAI is a regional initiative153 to promote anti-corruption reforms, share best practices 
and lessons learned and monitor progress. It is supported by a number of multi-lateral organizations 
and bi-lateral donors. Since 2004, Sarajevo has hosted the Initiative’s Regional Secretariat Liaison 
Office (RSLO). While SPAI had some moderate success in most of the other participating countries 
– mainly in promoting the adoption of comprehensive anti-corruption strategies and the 
establishment of specific anti-corruption agencies - it seems to have done little for BiH. This has as 
much to do with the specifics of the BiHn situation as with the vague objectives (and the lack of 
means to assist in delivering these objectives) of SPAI itself and the Initiative’s continuing dilemma 
of being unable to define its value-added vis-à-vis other frameworks, specifically that set by the 
Council of Europe’s GRECO.  
Council of Europe  
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a member of the Council of Europe (CoE) since January 2002. It 
signed the CoE’s Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption in 2000. Both Conventions 
were ratified and entered into force in 2002. This was a pre-condition for BiH joining of the CoE’s 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). GRECO provides for regular evaluation and peer 
review of the state of implementation of both Conventions and the CoE’s ‘Guiding Principles for 
the Fight against Corruption’. BiH underwent its first round of evaluation in 2002154. On 4 January 
2005, BiH submitted a situation report on the measures taken to implement the recommendations 
from this first evaluation round, which should be on the agenda for adoption by the evaluators in 
May 2005. The second round of evaluations is scheduled for September 2005.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is also part of the Council of Europe’s PACO Impact II project, a regional 
technical assistance project for the countries of the Western Balkans155 funded by Sida, which aims 
at cross-regional sharing of lessons learned and best practices in the fight against corruption. Since 
its inception in spring 2004, the project has held one activity in BiH - a stock-taking workshop on 
anti-corruption efforts, bringing together all relevant Bosnian stakeholders. It aimed at providing 
relevant regional expertise on the establishment of an anti-corruption agency, should the Bosnian 
authorities indeed decide to take the idea of such an agency forward. The planned workshop will 
also aim to discuss options for improving the Anti-corruption Strategy and the Action Plan within 
the Medium-Term Development Strategy (MTDS), in particular through the establishment of 
benchmarks for success and impact measurement.  
 
A further regional, multi-annual Council of Europe-led activity, funded by the EC156, is the 
‘Development of Reliable and Functioning Policing Systems and Enhancing of Combating Main 
Criminal Activities and Police Co-operation (CARPO)’-project. CARPO aims at strengthening the 
                                                 
153 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia 
are participating in the SPAI.  
154 GRECO evaluations are looking at the implementation of a selected number of the ‘Guiding Principles’. 
The first round evaluation report of BiH was adopted at the GRECO Plenary Meeting in Strasbourg in July 
2003 and can be found at http://www.greco.coe.int/evaluations/Default.htm.  
155 The project covers Albania, BiH and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro including 
Kosovo. SIDA contribution to the project is € 1, 5 Million.  
156 The project’s duration is planned to be from 2004 to 2006. It is funded with € 4,4 million. 
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capacities of the CARDS countries to develop and implement regional strategies against serious 
forms of crime based on the acquis communautaire and other European standards and practices. It 
also aims to provide law enforcement institutions with the tools necessary to implement these 
strategies; and to build up capacities for: financial investigations aimed at the confiscation of 
proceeds from crime; a more effective use of special investigative means and intelligence in 
accordance with human rights standards; and the creation of effective mechanisms to protect 
witnesses of serious crime. CARPO intends to contribute to more efficient cooperation in criminal 
matters among the countries of South-eastern Europe and to build up training capacities related to 
trafficking in human beings, smuggling and illegal migration based on standards and benchmarks in 
line with EU policies and practices157. 
 
BiH is also part of the Council of Europe’s MONEYVAL, an experts’ group that was set up in 
1997, which through evaluation and peer pressure reviews ‘the anti-money laundering measures and 
measures to counter the financing of terrorism in Council of Europe member states’158 which are not 
members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Bosnia and Herzegovina has undergone the 
first evaluation round in 2003, but the findings have not yet been made public 159. 
Mutual Legal Assistance  
BiH has ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime which has entered into force in July 2004160. Ratification 
of the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters is still outstanding. 
General knowledge and understanding about instruments and mechanisms of mutual legal 
assistance seems to be weak161. However, this appears to be due to insufficient priority given to the 
issue by the Bosnian authorities rather than the lack of assistance or training opportunities on the 
subject162.  
Interpol 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is member of Interpol and thus, at least theoretically, committed to this 
organization’s activities in fighting, inter alia, corruption, financial crime, drugs, children and 
human trafficking and in cooperating on criminal intelligence analysis163. 
 
Responsibility for international law enforcement (i.e. international treaties and relations with 
Interpol) lies according to the BiH Constitution with the institutions at State-level, which might be 
one of the explanations why the level of responsiveness and involvement or the authorities to these 
instruments has been very poor.  
                                                 
157 http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal_co-
operation/Combating_economic_crime/Regional_project_CARDS_Police/  
158 See 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal%5Faffairs/Legal%5Fco%2Doperation/Combating%5Feconomic%5Fcrime/Mo
ney%5Flaundering/  
159 See also 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal%5Faffairs/Legal%5Fco%2Doperation/Combating%5Feconomic%5Fcrime/Mo
ney%5Flaundering/Evaluations/Reports_summaries.asp#TopOfPage  
160 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=141&CM=3&DF=2/18/05&CL=ENG  
161 Information provided by interviewee. 
162 Mutual Legal Assistance (assistance in drafting legislation and training) is covered by two EC CARDS 
projects implemented by the Council of Europe. Regional countries indicate to finding it difficult to make 
progress with BiH on this matter.  
163 http://www.interpol.org/  
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United Nations Convention against Corruption 
BiH has not yet signed the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption. There has been pressure to 
accede to the Convention from Transparency International. The Convention’s Article 6 on 
‘Preventive Anti-corruption body or bodies’ calls on parties to establish such structures. It could be 
argued that there is by now already a proliferation of institutions in BiH that are – at least 
theoretically – well placed to fight efficiently against corruption. The establishment of yet another 
such agency might therefore be questionable, whether it is funded from either finite donor money or 
from BiH’s State budget – it does not appear to be sustainable. If the Bosnian authorities do want to 
pursue such an agency, they should be pressured to define very precisely ex ante  what such an 
agency would do and what its value added would be vis-à-vis existing structures.  
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
The Anti-corruption Strategy of the MTDS notes BiH’s aspiration to join the OECD Convention on 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. It would be a mistake, however, for this to become a priority of 
the Bosnian authorities. The OECD Convention specifically targets the major exporting nations – 
BiH is unlikely to become a big exporter in the near or medium-term future. Like the membership 
in GRECO, adherence to the Convention requires the allocation of substantial resources for the 
participation in the peer review process. BiH would be better advised to allocate existing scarce 
resources to fulfill its obligations under GRECO, and in due course to the UN Convention.   
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5. Recommendations for Sida Interventions  
5.1 Emerging Lessons 
· Compared to other countries in the region, BiH has seen relatively few explicit anti-
corruption programs and projects. Instead, corruption has been addressed in the framework 
of wider sector reforms and the overall establishment of the rule of law, encompassing the 
introduction of a legislative framework with a strong focus on repressive aspects, and 
efforts to depoliticize the enforcement structures and the judiciary, and to establish 
independent oversight and control mechanisms.  
 
· The scarcity of explicit anti-corruption programs and projects in BiH so far is actually a 
positive. It has been shown elsewhere how hard it is to build efforts on a legacy of failed 
anti-corruption initiatives, as this legacy often implies unmet expectations after a massive 
build-up, resulting in an even greater than usual cynicism and consequently, less support of 
the public. And while corruption is an issue of concern, it needs to be disentangled into its 
segments to be addressed efficiently. Just to say: let’s fight corruption, without linking it to 
sectoral reforms is unlikely to work. In this respect, the overall approach taken by the 
international community in BiH appears to be the right one.  
 
· Another argument against explicit anti-corruption programming is the fact that there will be 
even less enthusiasm and ownership by the authorities for such projects than for others. Few 
administrations and governments like to be publicly associated with corruption - except 
where there is a strong political will to tackle the issue - and having to implement a project 
carrying corruption in its title is doing just that. 
 
· While the establishment of the legislative framework has been broadly successful and 
corresponds to international standards, the de-politicization and independence of 
enforcement, judiciary and oversight bodies has at best been partly successful. Yet without 
efficient and effective enforcement, these reforms will have been in vain.  
 
· This impression is reinforced by the lack of efforts to capture the impact of the reforms 
undertaken (in particular having the end-users/citizens in mind), which, in turn, might be 
caused by the general lack of data that such efforts would need. 
 
· While there have been a lot of reform efforts introducing a new legal framework and 
establishing corresponding institutions and structures, capacity building and training for 
these institutions is lagging behind. This concerns training on general issues, such as 
management and specialized issues, such as dealing with fiscal and financial crime.   
 
· For training purposes it is important that the international community bring in highly 
qualified personnel who are able to do hands on mentoring. Models that focus on 
knowledge transfers trough twinning exercises are likely to be more effective, and surely 
more sustainable. 
 
· Finding credible and effective counterparts on all levels is a challenge for the donors. In the 
Bosnian context it is important to be aware that there is a pool of highly qualified persons 
available. Most of these people come from the younger generation, and some have studied 
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or worked abroad, indicating that they are less likely to be under the control of existing 
power structures.    
 
· There is a satisfactory institutional framework in place on paper to capture the twin tasks of 
corruption and organized crime. The State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA) is of 
special interest. A principal challenge will be, on the one hand, to give these newly 
established or already existing institutions political support  and, on the other hand, to 
safeguard or establish their independency from political interference. One of the 
manifestations political support will have to take is the appropriation and allocation of 
sufficient budgetary resources. 
 
· Like in many countries with a strong international donor presence, co-ordination is a weak 
point. This concerns in particular the lack of a jointly pursued vision and resulting 
fragmentation of efforts in the provision of technical assistance; on how the new legislative 
framework should be enforced; and how the different institutions should be logically 
interlinked.  
 
· The presence of international staff such as CAFAO experts in the ITA or international 
prosecutors in the State Prosecutor’s office is necessary for the moment; otherwise, there 
would be little realistic chance of the Bosnian prosecution taking on high-profile cases. 
Serious thought has now to be given to medium-term exit strategies of such assistance. 
International prosecutors cannot continue for much longer to fulfil a fig-leave function for a 
technically competent local prosecution. Yet, there appear to be no real signs of a gradual 
weakening of the dependence from international staff.    
 
· It is difficult to understand why the international community chooses to participate in the 
vetting process for some institutions, but opts out of other such processes, although they 
equally concern important institutions such as the ITA, the independence from political 
influence of which is crucial. Lack of transparency and politicization of the recruitment 
procedures for such authorities by criminal politicians that are trying to secure their short-
term rent seeking has a serious long-term effect on the efficiency and capacity of these 
institutions. Talented workforce is again left outside policy making. 
 
· The usefulness of the multitude of regional efforts that Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
participating in should be re-considered with view to the country’s pressing tasks and the 
demands these initiatives (such as SPAI) pose on limited human resources and capacities of 
its institutions. Regional awareness raising and lessons learned sharing on corruption and 
organized crime has probably reached the end of its lifespan. By inviting experts to endless 
regional roundtables and workshops, one has to wonder whether their time and efforts 
would not be better spent by focusing on priority work inside the country, rather than being 
away from their desks for a considerable part of their time. Regional countries – including 
BiH – have now to get down to looking for specific solutions for their specific problems. 
These include concrete steps to resolve specific regional problems, and most importantly 
the formalization of mutual legal assistance agreements with BiH’s neighbouring countries.  
 
· Red tape increases the opportunities for corrupt transactions to take place. Yet, simplifying 
too many regulations – as seems to be a trend in particular in the area of economic reforms - 
opens opportunities for corruption, too. A better balance needs to be found between 
facilitation of economic growth and effective checks and balances against abuse and corrupt 
activities.  
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Medium Term Development Strategy (or PRSP): While progress has been made in the 
implementation of the objectives of the Anti-corruption segment of the MTDS, there are the 
following concerns: 
 
· As has been pointed out elsewhere, the mere existence of an anti-corruption program is not 
an indicator of how seriously the government is in its commitment to implement it 164, in 
particular if it is, as in the case of BiH, a result of outside pressure. The fact that a number 
of the objectives set out in the strategy have been achieved already is not a real indicator of 
commitment, either, since ongoing reform efforts are largely driven by the international 
community, not so much by the Bosnian authorities.  
 
· There is a lack of indicators of success for the strategy and of benchmarks of how to 
measure progress and impact of the implementation of the objectives set out in the strategy. 
Experience from other countries suggests that this could lead to a situation of a successfully 
implemented, comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, with all objectives being ‘ticked’ off, 
while at the same time, the real-life situation will not have changed, or might have changed 
a little, but without the authorities being able to capture or measure this difference.  
 
· It has been noted above that there is a striking lack of information in general inside the 
government. It is not really clear what informs policy making and the design of reforms in 
general, and certainly the specific case of this anti-corruption strategy165. Given the 
difficulty of collating such data – not only for the Bosnian authorities, but for any other 
government, too – if seriously committed to implementation, the government must be asked 
and should be assisted, in establishing mechanisms to independently and continuously 
collect information/data to measure impact and progress, and to design subsequent reform 
efforts in response to this.  
 
· This concerns not only, but notably, corruption in the public service sector delivery (health, 
education) and at any other interface of citizens with the state (licensing, business 
registrations, public procurement, tax authorities, customs etc.). Having more and reliable 
data available will also be important for the relation of the Bosnian authorities with donors 
and the influence this could have on shaping technical assistance programs and projects.  
 
· The government does not feel that it needs to communicate its efforts to the public. In fact, 
public information or communication strategies or public education campaigns towards 
citizens do not play any significant role in the document at all. It should be brought back to 
the government that informing citizens is part of their brief, and that exploring ways of 
informing the public is a win-win situation for it, in that it has the potential to build the 
credibility of the reform efforts as well as to earn trust and support in their implementation.  
 
· The government should build on the stakeholder consultation mechanism that was used in 
the elaboration phase of the MTDS. However, future exercises and the work of the 20 
working groups monitoring the implementation should indeed be consultations, not pro-
forma exercises where comments are solicited from stakeholders that then rarely find their 
way into the final documents.  
 
                                                 
164 See, for example Franklin Steves and Alan Rousso: Anti-Corruption programmes in post-communist 
transition countries and changes in the business environment, 1999-2002, EBRD Working Paper No. 85, p. 7 
165 Which relies almost exclusively on 2002 data compiled by the Bosnian chapter of Transparency 
International. 
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· Repressive actions seem to be overemphasized, while preventive actions (and, as mentioned 
above, educational ones) do not seem to receive the emphasis they deserve.  
 
· There could be a concern that the MTDS (and its anti-corruption strategy) is de-prioritized 
by the Bosnian authorities in favor of the implementation of the 16 recommendations of the 
EC’s Feasibility study. This requires persistence particularly by those donors who have a 
strong emphasis on poverty reduction goals. The MTDS is broader in its ambitions than the 
Feasibility study requirement; these ambitions should not be abandoned for the benefit of a 
narrower reform agenda. 
5.2 Possible Sida interventions 
The international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has at its disposal a set of tools that it has 
in few other places: military, political, economic and social. Even so, corruption in the public sector 
is a delicate issue that should be given careful consideration. A tough approach might induce 
resistance that will lead to failure for the given intervention. It might also damage the relationship 
with the government. While a head on approach might work in some countries, a more indirect 
approach can be more effective.  
Policy Level 
After almost 10 years since the end of the war, it is becoming increasingly clear that the institutional 
set-up of BiH sanctioned by the Dayton Peace Agreement - based on strong entity level and weak 
state level structures –– is preventing the country from moving forward. It is too costly, too 
complex to instil trust of the citizens into the state, and too fragmented to provide for efficient 
safeguards against the abuse of public funding. More importantly, it consolidates the very power 
structures that were implicated in the unlawfulness of the war and that are the biggest obstacles for 
reform efforts. Sida’s interventions should be targeted at supporting the strengthening of State-level 
institutions and municipal level government (i.e. the level of government that is closest to their 
electorate) to the detriment of (as opposed to) efforts that support entity-level structures.  
 
Ways need to be found to build-up ownership of Bosnians for their country’s affairs at every level. 
The principle of ownership should be reconfirmed in all negotiations and dealings with Bosnian 
interlocutors – as should the absence of an alternative to ownership in light of the successive 
withdrawal of the International Community.  
Sida and Other Players in the International Community 
With an annual envelope of approximately €30 million, Sida is the biggest bi-lateral donor in BiH. 
It should lead by example and continue to communicate its concern about corruption to other 
international players in the country in order to keep it on the agenda of assistance delivery 
discussions. Sida should also continue to facilitate coordination efforts wherever possible.  
 
Where possible, Sida should also try to play a pro-active role on the overall direction reform efforts 
take, based on what it considers to be best practices and experience. For example, while the cutting 
of red tape in the economic area is intended to lead to kick-starting businesses and thus facilitate 
economic growth, developments in our own countries go in the opposite direction – inter alia, 
because deregulation also bears the risks of abuse and corruption.  
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Sida and Bosnian counterparts 
Sida should stress its policy and concerns with regards to corruption in all its negotiations with 
Bosnian counterparts. These concerns should be reflected in all relevant programming and project 
documents to be signed with beneficiaries. The concern over corruption should also consider a 
situation where implementing partners are held responsible for results, and fewer questions are 
asked over how these results were achieved. Where possible and useful, Sida might want to reflect 
on conditionality if anti-corruption provisions of agreements are not fulfilled. Sida might want to 
consider to pro-actively communicating its anti-corruption policy to stakeholders.  
 
In line with its assistance goals, Sida should insist in holding Bosnian counterparts responsible for 
policy commitments they have entered.  
 
· Most importantly, this concerns the Anti-Corruption Strategy of the Medium-Term 
Development Strategy (or Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). Although the MTDS’ goals 
are in line with those set by the EU pre-accession agenda, they also have a wider, pro-poor 
focus. The Bosnian authorities should not have an option to neglect these commitments by 
refocusing their attention on the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
negotiations, only.  
 
· SAA negotiations are likely to start in 2005. There is a possibility that this could lead to a 
de-prioritization and obstruction by the Bosnian authorities of some key reforms, such as 
the police reform. Sida should insist on the importance of such reforms – one of the tenets 
of which is the de-politicization of the police forces - for an effective response to 
corruption.  
 
· Sida should insist on the Bosnian counterparts fulfilling commitments entered on the 
regional level, in particular those in the framework of BiH’s membership of the Council of 
Europe, and specifically when it comes to agreements on the provision of mutual legal 
assistance with neighboring countries.  
Project and Programme Level 
Sida should build in (mainstream) anti-corruption safeguards in all interventions through a check for 
technical and welfare relevance. Technical relevance concerns whether a proposed programme or 
project will have an impact on the form of corruption one seeks to address. Welfare relevance on 
the other hand seeks to understand the importance of a given project or programme on overall 
targets like economic growth and poverty reduction. It is important to note that an intervention can 
be well suited for addressing a given corruption problem, but that reducing this form of corruption 
is a relative little importance on reducing poverty. Doing analysis on the root cause of any given 
problem and making sure that the tools are tailored to meet the context in question is of utmost 
importance. Entry points can be found at many levels. 
Pro-poor Projects: Social Audits 
Sida should consider addressing some of the issues addressed above, in particular in key public 
sector service delivery areas that affect the poor most. It is where people interact with the state that 
their trust in society is built up or lost. So could, for example, social audits in the health and 
education sectors involve a wide range of stakeholders at community level through a consultation 
mechanism. It could also provide the government at central level with data about the real situation 
on the ground and system leakages due to corruption and/or mismanagement that occur from the 
central level down to the local level. On the basis of this, remedies for existing leakages could be 
designed with stakeholders and policy makers, providing a model for an inclusive consultation 
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process. At the same time, authorities could be hands-on trained on data collation and processing. 
Repeat audits could measure impact of reforms and improvement of the situation from the 
stakeholder perspective. The advantage of such an approach to corruption would be that the 
government would be given tangible tools to make the distinction between mismanagement and 
corruption and to communicate this difference to the public. It would also fill the existing gap of 
absence of data needed for policy making and would build the capacity of the government to 
collect, analyse and translate data into efficient policy reforms. Further, the government would be 
seen to be tackling the problem.  
Support to Local/Municipal Level Politics 
The joint Sida/USAID funded Governance Accountability Project appears to be the right direction 
to take, and Sida should, after a first year evaluation - with stakeholders on the ground - consider to 
increasing this type of intervention. It increases transparency and accountability of local politicians 
vis-à-vis the electorate and supports those politicians with tangible mechanisms and tools, who have 
the interests of their citizens at the heart of their agenda. 
 
At the same time, efforts should continue to influence and support the strengthening of 
local/municipal level government through the elaboration of necessary legislation at central policy 
making level.  
Working with the Private Sector/Business Community 
More interventions should target the private sector/the business community (maybe based on the 
recommendations coming out from the EC functional reviews of the economic sector, but also 
based on the recommendations for piecemeal legal reform coming from the work of the Bulldozer 
Commission). There should be a particular focus on activities involving small- and medium size 
enterprises, on which much of the economic future of the country will depend, and which will, 
eventually, lose out on business in a corrupt environment. At the same time, Sida should be careful 
to not only target the small players, while big corruption (in state-owned enterprises and in 
corruptly privatized enterprises) thrives. This is a point that is often made by business people in the 
region, who represent small, ‘unsophisticated’ businesses, such as building/construction companies, 
for which there is a huge competition.  They feel that while initiatives to make their operations 
‘cleaner’ target them, nobody ever looks at the big fish. They also say that they have simply no 
other option than engaging in bribery and corruption, because if one of them really stays clean, the 
business will be handed down to the next one in the line, and there are plenty to chose from.  
 
The fragmentation of the business community is therefore an obvious weakness. Because one may 
rely on the power of numbers, more efforts should be used in strengthening the business 
associations and facilitate cooperation among them.166 A part of the “strengthening process” could 
be to increase their membership and to better organize their capacity and openness. This would 
reduce the need for informal means of communication with the government. It will further give the 
associations the technical capacity to influence policy. The dialogue between government and 
business should then not be based solely on the interests of a particular firm or industrial branch, but 
rather on the interests of the wider business community. 167 Every effort should also be made to 
ensure that these organizations, internally and as coalitions, cross over regional and ethnic barriers. 
Sida could also help promote corporate governance and support the development of ethics training 
programmes with business associations as part of a larger programme to develop the private sector.  
                                                 
166 This is already being done through support of the Regional Development agencies.  
167 The USAID funded Centre for International Private Enterprise have done projects along these lines. 
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One further avenue could be to work with the – albeit small - foreign investors’ community in BiH, 
to make sure that they lead by example.  
 
Other possible interventions could encompass involving the business community in 
overseeing the implementation of the new public procurement legislation. 
Working with Civil Society 
Large parts of civil society in BiH have lost credibility with donors.  Still, there is no real way 
around working with civil society on corruption prevention and there are positive rewards to be had.  
 
· Interventions could be conceivable that both assist the government on institutionalizing 
genuine working mechanisms of consulting with civil society. Likewise,  assistance could 
be given to civil society organisations that have been part of consultation exercises to exert 
more efficient pressure to have their views reflected in the resulting policies (as opposed to 
having them participate in a pro-forma exercise).  
· Possible projects could involve civil society at municipal/local levels, for example through 
supporting initiatives dealing with monitoring of municipal budgeting and local public 
procurement processes.  
· Other projects could involve civil society monitoring of pre-election/campaign financing by 
civil society groups, based on methodology and experience of other transition countries. 
 
When deciding on project beneficiaries, one of the requirements for applicants should be requested 
to demonstrate efforts made at acquainting themselves with lessons already learned from anti-
corruption projects in the region.  
 
Possibilities could be explored at supporting students’ groups that have started to look at corruption 
as a problem affecting them independently from funding available (such as at Tuzla university). 
Possibilities could be explored in linking up with the network of universities created by the 
Budapest-based Central European University, which created specific cross-faculty anti-corruption 
curricula.  
Addressing the information gap 
Sida should consider supporting projects that would fill the existing information gap inside 
government, in particular in such areas that have a direct impact on policy making that 
benefits the poor.  
Support to the Judiciary 
Sida could consider supporting the ongoing efforts to reform the judiciary by: 
 
· supporting the establishment of good Civil Courts; 
· supporting measures to improve the safety in courts (witness protection and protection of 
documents/files); 
· supporting the training of local prosecutors and judges on forensic auditing; 
· continued support to international prosecutors (both investigators and technical experts are 
needed). 
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Institutional Support 
The new legal framework introduced through wide-ranging legislative reforms over the past few 
years, Sida should now focus on making these reforms sustainable by supporting and strengthening 
those institutions that are charged with the enforcement of this new framework. This support could 
take a variety of forms: 
 
· This analysis has pointed to the involvement of the police, military and security 
establishment in corrupt networks. Donors should recognise that these institutions do not 
have the strength to reform themselves as the countervailing forces are so strong. Sida could 
therefore consider strengthening its support to the police and security sector. To not 
strengthen SIPA at this critical time is to let an opportunity slip for making a state level 
multiethnic security establishment work.    
 
· Funding of political parties and political competition is a difficult but necessary avenue to 
explore. More public financing of political parties is unlikely to reduce the problem of 
money in politics. Rather, parties can be supported in developing their capacity to conduct 
research, develop platforms, voter outreach campaigns etc. Political foundations in Sweden 
can be encouraged to make greater efforts to support their Bosnian counterparts. 
 
· The Election Commission needs support to strengthen its oversight function over the 
spending of political parties. This pertains especially to the Law on political party financing 
and the Law on Conflict of interest. 
 
· Training. There is still need for general training on issues such as management techniques, 
for example inside institutions such as the Indirect Taxation Authority and the institutions 
charged with the implementation of the new procurement legislation. Equally, there is 
endless scope for specialized training on issues pertaining to investigative techniques for 
financial crime etc.  
 
· Facilitation of introduction of relevant information technology: Sida could consider 
supporting the establishment of an intelligence database for the use of the ITA/the single 
customs administration modelled and equipped to the standards of Sweden or Denmark.  
 
· Continued Swedish support to the State Audit Institutions 
 
Some of the above suggested interventions are short-term ones. While, for example, there is still a 
strong need for seconding of international staff to local institutions, such as the State Audit Office 
or the State Prosecutor’s Office, this support will have to be phased out in the medium-term future. 
Sida should establish mechanisms to measure the impact of the work of the international 
prosecutors and discuss with OHR an exit strategy for this type of support.  
Training Courses for Sida Staff 
Sweden has recently joined the Utstein Group, and agency staff can be trained in this framework 
both through web based or in-country courses. In these courses staff can learn while at the same 
time share views and experiences with colleagues from other development agencies.  
 
One point that is made in these courses is that agencies that operate in a corruption prone 
environment like Bosnia and Herzegovina have few problems in pointing out the nature of the 
problem and its consequences. Analyses often hold that corruption is the mother of all ills, one 
which breeds a lack of political will and block development outcomes. If one share this grim 
assessment, endlessly long perspectives are foreseen in getting tangible results, or hasty exit 
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strategies are sought. Under both scenarios poor people and fragile states are left to fend for 
themselves. Sida has chosen neither of these strategies. While recognizing the fact that BiH has a 
long way to go in order to consolidate a functioning democracy, the agency is impatience, and has 
chosen to allocate both resources and personal to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 2006-2010 
period. For all those involved the problems described in this report constitute a serious intellectual 
and professional challenge.  
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SUMMARY
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we find that corruption exists in all its facets – bribery, 
nepotism, embezzlement, diversion of public funds, tax fraud, illegal rent seeking, 
kick-back schemes etc. The victims of corruption are often the most vulnerable 
groups: the elderly, the unemployed and other low-income groups, who cannot 
afford to pay for up-grades of health care services; women, who, through traditional 
role patterns, are more often exposed to corruption; and minorities, facing a 
judiciary and administration appointed according to ethnic majority criteria, are 
denied impartial treatment based on clearly established rules and regulations. 
Defining an anti-corruption agenda for the international community in general, 
and for bilateral donors like Sida in particular, is a challenge under these 
circumstances. Experience from anti-corruption interventions elsewhere 
suggests that progress cannot be achieved without the full cooperation of 
national authorities. The lack of political will described in this report could 
justify a recommendation not to engage until the circumstances have changed. 
However, the authors believe that it is essential to address corruption 
and organized crime in BiH – both in order to minimize the consequences 
for Europe and to facilitate the countries progress towards Europe. 
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